Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,056 copies47 likes38,421 views
11,679 detections
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Detects modifications to AWS IAM trust relationships, specifically the creation or update of SAML providers, OIDC providers, or the update of role trust policies containing wildcard principals. These actions are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish a durable, credential-less persistence mechanism via federated identity manipulation.
Detects modifications to AWS Lambda functions that indicate potential backdooring, specifically unauthorized resource policy grants (lambda:InvokeFunction with a wildcard principal) or unexpected function code/configuration updates. This activity enables persistent, low-visibility execution by leveraging existing function permissions.
Detects modifications to AWS Lambda functions that indicate potential backdooring, specifically unauthorized resource policy grants (lambda:InvokeFunction with a wildcard principal) or unexpected function code/configuration updates. This activity enables persistent, low-visibility execution by leveraging existing function permissions.
Detects the creation or modification of credentials (access keys or login profiles) for the AWS root account or identities explicitly named to imply high-privilege administrative access. This is a high-fidelity indicator of persistence or unauthorized privilege escalation within an AWS environment.
Detects unauthorized cross-account copying of AWS EC2 or RDS snapshots, a key indicator of data exfiltration or staging as part of a snapshot-theft attack chain. The rule correlates copy events where the source snapshot owner is different from the destination account ID.
Detects the deletion of AWS CloudWatch log groups, log streams, metric filters, CloudWatch alarms, and VPC Flow Logs. Such actions are often indicative of an adversary attempting to destroy forensic evidence or disable security alerting prior to further unauthorized activity, such as data exfiltration or resource abuse.
Detects modifications to AWS CloudTrail event selectors that result in a loss of audit coverage (e.g., stopping management event logging or narrowing the ReadWriteType), which is a technique used by sophisticated actors to silently evade detection while keeping the trail status as enabled.
Detects the creation of an AWS IAM access key (CreateAccessKey) for the root account or identities with administrative naming conventions. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has gained high-privileged access, as new access keys provide a durable way to maintain programmatic control that bypasses standard session-based security controls.
Detects unauthorized attempts to stop CloudTrail logging or delete existing CloudTrail configurations within an AWS environment. Disabling logging is a significant indicator of defense evasion, often used by attackers to mask subsequent malicious activities such as data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or resource abuse.
Detects the creation of a new AWS IAM role with a trust policy that permits access from an external or wildcard principal, which is often used as a persistence mechanism to allow unauthorized cross-account access. The rule also triggers if an AdministratorAccess policy is attached to a newly created role, as these actions are commonly chained in cloud intrusions.
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