Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,056 copies47 likes38,424 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects unauthorized attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS CloudTrail logging and supporting infrastructure. This includes stopping log delivery, deleting trails, reducing scope via event selectors, removing VPC flow logs or CloudWatch log groups, and unauthorized administrative actions against the S3 bucket designated for CloudTrail logs.
Detects the deployment of virtual machines with public IP addresses (in Azure) or compute instances with external IP addresses (in GCP) by a single principal within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a newly-privileged identity or an compromised account establishing externally-accessible infrastructure for further malicious activity.
Detects potential abuse of Cloud Shell to persist access in cloud environments. For GCP, it monitors the injection of SSH keys into instance or project metadata from a Cloud Shell session. For Azure, it detects a pattern involving Cloud Shell storage provisioning followed by a subsequent VM run-command or SSH public key update, indicating potential unauthorized management of virtual machines.
Detects the rapid, bulk launch of GPU-optimized or compute-intensive EC2 instances via API calls such as RunInstances, CreateFleet, or RequestSpotFleet within a short time window. This behavior is often indicative of cloud resource hijacking or cryptojacking, where compromised credentials are used to spin up expensive compute resources for illicit mining or intensive processing.
Detects potential privilege escalation in AWS where a user performs an iam:PassRole action to attach a highly privileged role (e.g., containing 'admin' or 'poweruser' in the name) to a newly created resource (Lambda, EC2 instance, or CloudFormation stack) within a short timeframe. This behavior is a known technique to gain elevated permissions by executing code within the context of a higher-privilege identity.
Detects modifications to AWS EBS or RDS snapshot attributes to grant access to unauthorized or external AWS accounts, or the copying of snapshots to unauthorized accounts, which are common techniques for data exfiltration from cloud environments.
Detects various administrative actions in AWS that result in the disabling, deletion, or suppression of security monitoring services and configurations, including CloudTrail, Security Hub, and AWS Config. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade detection by blinding security teams.
Detects anomalous or suspicious creation of AWS IAM access keys, particularly those targeting highly privileged accounts (e.g., 'root') or involving cross-user key generation by non-administrative entities. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover, persistence establishment, or privilege escalation within the AWS environment.
Detects attempts to disable, degrade, or bypass cloud-native security monitoring services in GCP and Azure. This includes disabling GCP Security Command Center, creating broad mute configurations for security findings, downgrading Azure Defender for Cloud pricing tiers, or deleting Azure security automation workflows. These actions are common indicators of defense evasion during an incident.
Detects modifications to AWS S3 bucket permissions or public access block settings that result in publicly accessible buckets. The rule specifically monitors CloudTrail events such as PutBucketAcl, PutBucketPolicy, and PutPublicAccessBlock for configurations that permit AllUsers/AuthenticatedUsers access, overly permissive bucket policies with wildcard principals, or the deactivation of all four block-public-access settings.
Page 154 of 1168