Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,056 copies47 likes38,430 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects the use of 'winget configure' to retrieve and apply a Desired State Configuration (DSC) file from a remote HTTPS URL. This behavior can be abused to execute malicious configuration scripts directly from the internet.
Detects the execution of the Python interpreter (pythonw.exe) renamed to 'codeflush.exe' residing in non-standard paths like '\Public\Music\MusicLibrariesPackage\'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to camouflage malicious Python scripts or binaries as legitimate files to evade detection.
Detects the WinGet DSC configuration engine spawning service management processes such as sc.exe or PowerShell to create or modify Windows services. This activity is consistent with the abuse of DSC 'Service' resources to achieve persistence or privilege escalation by registering services to run as LocalSystem.
This rule monitors cloud application events for high-frequency, automated API calls directed at AI/ML inference endpoints. A high volume of queries (over 1000) accessing a diverse range of objects (over 50) within a short window (60 minutes) by a single identity or IP address is flagged. Such behavior is characteristic of model extraction or distillation attacks, where an adversary probes an AI model to replicate its capabilities or internal parameters.
Detects anomalous file access patterns by Semantic Kernel agent processes attempting to read sensitive host files such as SSH keys, configuration files, and credential stores. This activity is indicative of malicious use of agent file-transfer capabilities, potentially exploiting path traversal vulnerabilities or prompt injection to exfiltrate sensitive data from the host environment into the agent sandbox.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) activity leveraging the OpenAI Assistants API. The rule identifies non-standard processes (e.g., PowerShell, Python, cmd) that establish network connections to OpenAI API endpoints, specifically those often used for interaction with AI models, suggesting potential abuse of AI services for command issuance or data exfiltration.
Detects potential misuse of AI agentic frameworks (e.g., Semantic Kernel) where the host process executes destructive commands (e.g., file deletion, wiping, shadow copy deletion) or performs large-scale file deletion, which may indicate unauthorized tool invocation or compromised AI agents.
Detects a potential AI agent data poisoning event where a file is downloaded from an untrusted source (browser or sync client) and subsequently read within one hour by a process associated with AI agent activity (e.g., semantic_kernel, SKAgent). This pattern is often used to inject malicious context or prompt injection vectors into RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems.
Detects anomalous process execution originating from a Python-based sandbox (such as Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin in Azure Container Apps) that attempts to break out of the container isolation. The rule monitors for command-line arguments involving interaction with the Docker socket, sensitive host namespaces, or container privilege escalation techniques, indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-25592.
Page 175 of 1168