Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects anomalous DNS queries that utilize long labels or non-standard record types (TXT, NULL, CNAME) which are frequently associated with DNS tunneling and command-and-control communication. The rule flags endpoints with a high volume of these suspicious requests or exceptionally long domain labels.
Detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying anomalous behavior where a single account requests 5 or more unique Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) tickets within a 5-minute window, excluding common service accounts and krbtgt ticket requests. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to enumerate and obtain tickets for multiple services for offline brute-force password cracking.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by monitoring for common bypass techniques such as reflective loading of AmsiUtils, tampering with the amsiInitFailed field, or memory patching of AmsiScanBuffer via Script Block Logging (EventID 4104).
Detects unauthorized Active Directory replication requests (DCSync) by monitoring Event ID 4662 for specific directory replication GUIDs originating from computers not identified as domain controllers or by accounts not pre-approved for replication tasks.
Detects the abuse of common Windows LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) like regsvr32, mshta, certutil, and rundll32 to proxy the execution of remote scripts, DLLs, or malicious payloads, a technique often used to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line flags (EncodedCommand, NoProfile, WindowStyle Hidden, ExecutionPolicy Bypass) combined with either potential Base64-encoded payloads or network-based download cradles (e.g., Invoke-Expression, WebClient).
This rule identifies potential lateral movement or account compromise by detecting accounts that have performed NTLM network logons or authentication (Events 4624/4776) without corresponding Kerberos pre-authentication or interactive logon events within a 15-minute window. This pattern often indicates the use of stolen credentials (e.g., Pass-the-Hash) to access network resources rather than standard interactive user activity.
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike SMB beacon activity by identifying the creation of suspicious named pipes (commonly associated with Cobalt Strike) and correlating them with low-jitter, uniform outbound network communication patterns typical of command and control (C2) beaconing behavior.
Detects the Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) spawning a shell/script interpreter or rundll32.exe as a child process, or loading a DLL from a driver-store/temp/ProgramData path — the process-injection and arbitrary-DLL-load pattern characteristic of PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) exploitation.
Detects Active Directory enumeration consistent with BloodHound/SharpHound collection: SharpHound.exe or PowerView cmdlet process/command-line signatures, matching PowerShell script block log content, and bursts of LDAP traffic (ports 389/636) from a single source to a domain controller.
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