Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,064 copies47 likes38,439 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a single user account authenticates via NTLM to three or more distinct target hosts within a short time window (10 minutes). This pattern of rapid, broad authentication is a strong indicator of a Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attack.
This rule detects potential lateral movement via WMI by identifying two distinct suspicious behaviors: WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unexpected child processes (excluding common legitimate processes) or the usage of wmic.exe and PowerShell cmdlets (Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod) to execute processes on remote systems, as indicated by command line arguments specifying target nodes or computer names.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility that point to suspicious script execution, encoded commands, or files located in commonly abused writable directories like Temp or ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms.
Detects the assignment of special, highly privileged rights (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege) to standard user accounts using Windows Security Event ID 4672. This activity, without an associated new logon event, is a common indicator of access token manipulation or impersonation techniques (such as those used by tools like Incognito) to gain elevated system privileges.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for lateral movement and remote code execution. The rule monitors for common WMI exploitation vectors, including the use of wmic.exe for process creation, PowerShell or C# invocations of WMI/CIM methods (such as Win32_Process Create), WMI event subscription registration for persistence, and the execution of mofcomp.exe.
Detects common LSASS memory dumping techniques, including suspicious process access rights (EventID 10) and the execution of tools or techniques (EventID 1) such as comsvcs.dll, procdump, taskmgr, or werfault, which are often used to harvest credentials.
Detects suspicious cross-process access patterns targeting trusted system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, notepad.exe) by utilizing broad process access rights (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD). This behavior is characteristic of process injection techniques like process hollowing, often employed by loaders and malware to execute code within the context of a legitimate process.
Detects the abuse of Windows signed binaries (LOLBins) rundll32.exe and regsvr32.exe for proxy execution. Rundll32.exe activity is monitored for the use of javascript: pseudo-protocol or comsvcs.dll for MiniDump operations, while regsvr32.exe activity is monitored for Squiblydoo-style remote scriptlet execution via /i:http and other suspicious flag combinations.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments often used by adversaries for obfuscation, evasion, or in-memory code execution, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, and downloading external content.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry 'Run' or 'RunOnce' keys where the configured value points to a file located in common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, Temp, ProgramData) with an executable extension (.exe, .dll, .scr, .bat, .vbs, .ps1, .cmd). This pattern is a common technique used by adversaries to establish persistence by ensuring malicious code executes automatically upon user login or system startup.
Page 195 of 1168