Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,065 copies47 likes38,448 views
11,679 detections
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This rule detects potential MFA phishing attempts by identifying access to known malicious domains used for MFA credential harvesting within email communications and network traffic. It flags instances where users interact with domains masquerading as legitimate multi-factor authentication setup or registration services.
Detects instances where the Node.js process (node.exe) is executed with a command-line argument referencing 'sharedLoad.min.js'. This is often used in web-based applications or potentially malicious obfuscated scripts, but may flag legitimate JavaScript automation tasks.
Detects unauthorized processes, excluding standard web browsers, accessing sensitive browser files such as Login Data, Cookies, Web Data, and Local State. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting malware attempting to steal authentication cookies, saved passwords, or browser profiles.
Detects a malicious payload masquerading as a ClaudeDesktop installer that uses DLL sideloading via a tampered libcef.dll and a repurposed JetBrains binary to execute the SectopRAT .NET RAT.
Detection of network traffic patterns associated with the NovaCookies Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kit. The rules monitor for DNS queries for .vu domains, HTTP requests to lookalike Microsoft 365 login pages hosted on .vu domains, POST requests containing credential data, and the receipt of specific session cookies (ESTSAUTH) indicative of successful AiTM session interception.
This rule detects network activity and cloud API events indicative of an adversary utilizing the VAPI.ai platform to orchestrate automated voice-phishing (vishing) campaigns. It correlates outbound network connections to VAPI.ai endpoints with specific webhook callback patterns used to track call status for victim records.
Detects the specific network-observable behavior of the JWR client engine. The rule identifies a device loading the engine script (main.js) followed within a short time window by either a fallback redirection to a_index.html or the initiation of a WebSocket connection using a specific obfuscated path pattern associated with JWR command and control.
Detects potential account compromise by identifying a specific sequence of behavior: reconnaissance of sensitive users (HR/Payroll) via Microsoft Graph API calls, followed by the creation of inbox rules (e.g., forwarding) by the same user account within a 12-hour window.
Detects anomalous, automated non-interactive sign-in activity in Microsoft 365 where a session token is replayed from a new source IP address approximately every 8 hours. This pattern is characteristic of automated token-refresh tooling, such as that associated with Storm-2755, utilizing specific user-agents (Firefox 131.0/151.0 or python-requests) that deviate from the user's typical browser fingerprint.
Detects the creation of inbox rules (e.g., move, delete, stop processing) on M365 accounts, followed by the transmission of emails with subjects related to 'direct deposit'. This pattern is frequently observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) campaigns where attackers automate the concealment or exfiltration of sensitive payroll-related communications.
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