Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,048 copies47 likes38,291 views
11,679 detections
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Detects anomalous use of an AI agent session or OAuth token from multiple distinct IP addresses, hostnames, or user-agents within a short 10-minute window. This behavior is highly indicative of token theft and replay, where an adversary attempts to use a compromised session token from a different location or environment.
Detects the creation or modification of SSH authorized_keys or authorized_keys2 files. This is a common persistence technique used to maintain remote access by adding an adversary-controlled public key to a user's configuration, often performed after initial access through exploitation of public-facing services.
Detects instances where the Windows Explorer process (the parent of the 'Run' dialog) spawns common command-line interpreters. This behavior is indicative of the 'ClickFix' phishing technique, where users are socially engineered to paste malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects rapid creation of numerous .lnk shortcut files on removable media volumes, specifically targeting filenames that mimic common installers (e.g., ChromeSetup, AnyDesk). This behavior is characteristic of worm-like malware attempting to use removable drives for persistence and lateral movement by masquerading as legitimate software.
Detects network connections over port 443 to domains that have not been observed in the environment during the preceding 30-day window, specifically targeting domains with character-diversity patterns indicative of algorithmic generation rather than standard human-readable naming conventions.
Detects instances where a user account registers a new MFA security method shortly after an initial successful sign-in from an unfamiliar device or network (Autonomous System Number). This behavioral pattern is characteristic of attackers, such as ShinyHunters vishing operators, who gain initial access via compromised credentials and subsequently enroll their own MFA devices to establish persistent access.
Detects unauthorized configuration or content changes (e.g., login or portal pages) performed outside of standard business hours by user accounts that have recently exhibited high-risk or compromised authentication behavior. This pattern aligns with tactics observed in the ShinyHunters playbook where compromised accounts are used to deface public-facing applications.
Detects potential MFA push fatigue (bombing) attacks by identifying users who receive an abnormal frequency of MFA push notification denials or interruptions within a short window, followed immediately by a successful authentication on a previously unseen device fingerprint. This pattern is characteristic of attackers attempting to wear down users into approving unauthorized login requests.
Detects instances where an administrative, helpdesk, or support account registers or updates security info (such as MFA methods) for a user, specifically when this action is preceded by a password reset for that same user. This pattern is indicative of account takeover attempts, particularly those involving vishing-based social engineering of helpdesk staff to bypass MFA.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) launched directly from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox). The rule specifically flags common obfuscation techniques such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or attempts to download and execute code (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) while excluding explicit file-based script executions.
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