Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,115 copies47 likes38,515 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects periodic outbound network connections from rnpkeys.exe characteristic of the Sauron Loader C2 beaconing. The rule identifies a consistent heartbeat pattern (approx. 600 seconds) between successful C2 polls to the same remote host, distinguishing it from typical user-driven browser traffic.
Detects instances where a user grants high-privilege permissions (Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, offline_access) to an OAuth application within 24 hours of a risky sign-in event. This pattern is commonly observed in AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) or consent-phishing attacks designed to establish persistent access to cloud resources.
No description available.
Detects instances where an administrative user performs a password or MFA method reset on a target account, followed within 24 hours by a sign-in event from that same target account flagged with a high or medium risk level. This sequence is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks, where an attacker utilizes stolen session tokens and subsequently coerces helpdesk or administrative intervention to reset MFA requirements to maintain unauthorized access.
Detects network traffic patterns indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) strings matching common SaaS login portals (Microsoft, Okta, Google) paired with SSL/TLS certificates issued by 'Let's Encrypt' that contain suspicious subject names, suggesting a freshly generated infrastructure for credential harvesting.
This rule detects potential account compromise by identifying scenarios where a user's security information (MFA methods) is modified, deleted, or updated, followed shortly after (within 24 hours) by a successful sign-in using a less secure authentication method (SMS, Voice, OATH, or Mobile App notification) instead of a stronger method like FIDO2 or Passkey.
Detects outbound proxy traffic indicating potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity. The rule identifies requests directed at domains mimicking major Identity Providers (Microsoft, Okta, Duo, Google) that either utilize punycode homograph encoding or arrive via known URL shortener/redirector services, while filtering out known legitimate brand domains.
Detects MFA request abuse (T1621) by identifying a user receiving 5 or more MFA push, SMS, or call denials/timeouts within a 10-minute window across Entra ID, Okta, or Duo authentication logs. This behavior is indicative of an MFA fatigue attack, where an adversary continuously triggers MFA prompts until the user eventually approves the request out of frustration or confusion.
Detects web-proxy or webserver log activity associated with domains registered within the last 30 days that mimic branding or structure of major identity providers (Microsoft, Okta, Google, Duo). This behavior is characteristic of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure staging.
Detects the reuse of session identifiers (SessionId, DeviceId, or RefreshTokenJti) across different device fingerprints (e.g., changes in User-Agent, OS, or Browser) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks, where stolen session tokens or cookies are replayed by an attacker from a different endpoint than the original user.
Page 238 of 1168