Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed to 'kmot.co/board.php', which is associated with Command and Control (C2) activity from the Chinotto Python-based backdoor attributed to APT37.
Detects proxy requests directed towards the Microsoft OAuth2 device authorization endpoint originating from suspicious referrers (e.g., .de top-level domains). This pattern is consistent with device code phishing attacks where users are redirected from external malicious sites to a legitimate Microsoft authentication page to obtain an authorization code.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects the creation of files in the Windows Temp directory that match specific naming patterns associated with UnixStealer, including tool executables, database files, stolen data archives, and debug logs. These artifacts are characteristic of the tool's staging and activity tracking behaviors.
Detects network activity associated with the FlowerStorm/Storm-1167 phishing campaign. The rule monitors for credential exfiltration to a specific malicious URI (e.g., /google.php) containing login parameters, as well as the delivery of spoofed Microsoft sign-in pages from the associated phishing infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detects network traffic (HTTP, TLS, and DNS) originating from the internal network directed toward Telegram's API endpoints (api.telegram.org) and domains (t.me). This behavior is often associated with the use of the Telegram Bot API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for data exfiltration by malware.
Detects network traffic (HTTP, TLS, and DNS) originating from the internal network directed toward Telegram's API endpoints (api.telegram.org) and domains (t.me). This behavior is often associated with the use of the Telegram Bot API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for data exfiltration by malware.
Detects the creation of a 'SystemIn.lnk' persistence shortcut on Windows systems using PowerShell and the WScript.Shell COM object. This activity is associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, part of the QUICSILVER operation, which uses temporary PowerShell scripts to establish persistence.
Detects potential process injection attempts by unidentified executable files originating from suspicious directories (AppData or Temp) targeting critical system or service processes (e.g., explorer.exe, svchost.exe). The rule monitors CreateRemoteThread events and excludes signed dotnet host processes, characteristic of Hannibal Stealer behavior.
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