Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,116 copies47 likes38,524 views
11,679 detections
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Detects the execution of rundll32.exe from a WebDAV network path ('@\DavWWWRoot\') where specific suspicious substrings (e.g., 'verification.google', 'pf.ch', 'moor', 'CfgInspectModuleData') are present in the command line. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of remote payloads or malicious DLLs to bypass security controls.
This rule monitors for suspicious process behaviors and module loads, specifically focusing on unusual explorer.exe parentage, the loading of common system DLLs (dbghelp.dll, Secur32.dll) in potentially anomalous contexts, and specific command-line strings that may indicate malicious activity or tools.
Detects SMB traffic targeting the IPC$ share within the internal network, which is a common behavior of PIVOTPIPE lateral movement techniques using SMB named pipes for peer-to-peer (P2P) beacon communication.
Detects the PIVOTPIPE .NET loader, which identifies and extracts a 'core.pak' file containing the RAT payload. The loader performs XOR-decoding and GZIP-decompression to reflectively load the malicious payload into memory using .NET reflection methods, bypassing traditional file-based execution.
Detects attempts to modify AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) provider registry keys or tampering with the amsi.dll file. These actions are indicative of efforts to disable or blind security instrumentation, often as a precursor to or during malicious code execution.
Detects network connection events initiated by known beaconing-related process names. These processes are associated with command and control infrastructure or pivot nodes often used by adversaries for post-compromise activity.
Correlates an MFA method change with the next sign-in occurring from an ASN/country never seen for that user in 30 days, operationalizing TrustSphere's 2026 finding that reset-then-new-location access is the clearest signal separating a hijack from a genuine recovery.
Flags anomalous volume of Entra ID sign-ins using the device-code authorization grant, matching the Kali365 phishing-as-a-service technique (sold on Telegram, ~$250/month per FBI PSA) that captures Microsoft 365 OAuth tokens through the legitimate device-code flow.
Flags installation of RMM tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer, Atera, Splashtop) on an endpoint shortly after that user's account undergoes a password/MFA reset — matches the post-vishing tooling pattern CrowdStrike attributes to Mutant Spider (loaders including PrionFlaire and SocksLoader) and Scattered Spider.
Aggregates MFA/passkey enrollments tenant-wide, alerting when an unusual number of distinct users register new authenticators within a short rolling window — a mass-takeover indicator rather than isolated recovery activity, especially when linked by a common actor or source ASN.
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