Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,116 copies47 likes38,524 views
11,679 detections
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Detects execution of rundll32.exe and regsvr32.exe with command lines indicative of living-off-the-land techniques, including usage of remote scriptlets, URLs, JavaScript, and execution from non-standard system paths, which are often used for proxy execution or to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation or download flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand, IEX, DownloadString) specifically when the parent process is a common attack vector entry point such as Office applications, web browsers, or script hosts (wscript/cscript/mshta). This behavior is characteristic of phishing-based execution chains.
Detects anomalous Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests using weak RC4-HMAC (0x17) encryption. The rule looks for accounts requesting multiple service tickets for distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs) within a short time window, which is a common behavior pattern for tools like Rubeus or GetUserSPNs.py during the credential-harvesting phase of a Kerberoasting attack.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services (Event IDs 7045 and 4697) where the service binary path points to potentially suspicious locations such as user profiles, temp directories, program data, or common command interpreters. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries for persistence mechanisms or to deploy malicious drivers/tools.
This rule detects potential Windows token manipulation by correlating logon events containing sensitive privileges (SeDebugPrivilege/SeImpersonatePrivilege) with subsequent process creation events under a different user context within a short timeframe. It further validates the activity by incorporating Sysmon Event ID 10 alerts that identify process access patterns commonly associated with token duplication or impersonation techniques used in post-exploitation frameworks like Cobalt Strike.
Detects the creation of Windows scheduled tasks that include suspicious interpreters (PowerShell, cmd.exe, rundll32) or execution paths located in common attacker-writable directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData), which is a common technique for persistence and command-and-control re-establishment.
Detects a single user account performing an unusually high volume of Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests (Event ID 4769) within a short window, specifically using RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is highly characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request tickets for various service principal names (SPNs) to perform offline password cracking.
Detects techniques associated with LSASS process credential dumping, including direct handle access to the LSASS process with specific access masks (common in tools like Mimikatz), the use of rundll32.exe to invoke comsvcs.dll for memory dumping, and the creation of LSASS dump files on disk.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes employing common obfuscation and evasion techniques frequently associated with fileless malware loaders and malicious script execution. This includes the use of EncodedCommand, Base64 strings, IEX/Invoke-Expression download cradles, and stealth execution flags (e.g., hidden windows combined with non-interactive modes).
Detects persistence attempts by monitoring modifications to Windows registry run keys (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon Shell/Userinit) or file creation within the Startup folder. It alerts when these locations are updated to reference suspicious file paths (Temp/AppData) or execute scripts (vbs, ps1, js, wsf, bat, hta).
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