Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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This rule detects malicious PowerShell execution originating from common Office or script-based parent processes (explorer.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe). The detection specifically looks for hidden command-line flags combined with indicators related to the Konni/VelvetCake campaign, such as specific artifact filenames (update1.vbs, update2.ps1) or remote downloads from raw.githubusercontent.com.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' and the subsequent execution of 'update1.ps1' or 'update2.ps1' by 'explorer.exe'. This behavior is associated with the Konni/VelvetCake malware families, which use this technique to maintain persistence and C2 connectivity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands initiated by LNK files, characteristic of Konni/VelvetCake spear-phishing campaigns. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes launched by shell applications (explorer, rundll32, etc.) using hidden windows and fetching specific malware-related filenames or downloading from AppData directories.
Detects second-stage reconnaissance patterns indicative of the VelvetCake framework. The rule identifies PowerShell execution that combines multiple discovery commands (system information, network configuration, process listing, file system inspection, and antivirus/security software enumeration) within a single execution sequence or related process events.
Detects non-browser and non-messaging processes accessing both browser credential stores (like 'Login Data' or 'Cookies') and messaging application session storage (Slack/Discord LevelDB) in a single session. This pattern is characteristic of credential-stealing malware, such as RevStealer, which targets both saved web browser credentials and application session tokens for exfiltration.
Detects RevStealer malware attempting to use blockchain infrastructure for C2 communication or failover. The rules identify specific 'eth_call' JSON-RPC method calls to Polygon smart contracts containing hardcoded indicators, as well as TLS connections to known public RPC providers used as fallback C2 infrastructure.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
This rule detects potential execution of Vidar Stealer by identifying specific diagnostic loader strings (e.g., 'Loader: write failed') within file modification and process execution events. The presence of these strings in file metadata or command-line arguments indicates stage-specific activity related to the malware's loading process.
Detects a SYSTEM-level dllhost.exe process, associated with specific COM object instantiation (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0}), loading a DLL from the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker-planted DLL being unmarshaled through a crafted OBJREF, effectively bypassing security controls like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL.
Detects the compiled x86/x64 fetch-decode-execute dispatch loop used by the Vidar Stealer custom VM bytecode interpreter (v2.0+). The rule identifies the structural jump-table bounds-check and computed-jump idiom that is consistent across different builds of the malware, despite randomization of opcode values and XOR keys.
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