
Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects instances where the Greenshot.exe application loads DLLs (log4net.dll, GreenshotPlugin.dll, LinqBridge.dll) from locations outside of the expected installation directory ('\Program Files\Greenshot' or '\Program Files (x86)\Greenshot'). The rule also tracks the creation of configuration or updater files ('greenshot-defaults.ini', 'updater.bat') which may be indicative of unauthorized modification, persistence, or potential DLL side-loading attempts.
Detects rapid execution of multiple discovery-related commands (whoami, tasklist, ipconfig, netstat, systeminfo) by common Windows host processes within a 15-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary performing reconnaissance after gaining an initial foothold.
This rule detects the loading of a driver named 'eb.sys' (or matching a specific SHA256 hash) paired with the creation of a Windows service for that driver via the 'sc' command. This behavior is indicative of potential rootkit installation or driver-based persistence mechanisms.
Detects execution of Windows Installer packages (MSI) masquerading as common software installers (Spotify, Zoom, Microsoft Teams) using known ChainScript-style naming patterns and suspicious command-line parameters (e.g., ALLUSERS=2, MSIINSTALLPERUSER=1) or invocation from common user-mode applications like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or explorer.exe.
Detects the execution of processes or creation of events attempting to mimic Windows Security credential prompts. This pattern is characteristic of the TukTuk C2 framework's 'Cred Prompt' feature, designed to harvest user credentials by presenting a fake authentication dialog.
Detects emails containing URLs to known GitHub repositories used as lures for fake coding challenges or job interviews. These lures are often associated with DPRK-aligned threat actors (e.g., Jade Sleet, TraderTraitor) targeting technical roles.
Detects potential anti-analysis or sandbox evasion behavior where a process checks for the existence of the Cursor IDE application using native system utilities like ps, pgrep, or lsof. This check is often used by malware (such as the FLATROOF/ROOFDECK backdoors) to gate beaconing activity by ensuring the execution environment is not an analysis sandbox.
Detects the use of PowerShell to delete files with common script or shortcut extensions from directories frequently used for persistence or staging malicious payloads, such as APPDATA, ProgramData, and the Startup folder.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that use Invoke-Expression and Invoke-RestMethod in combination with specific suspicious domains, file extensions, or indicators of web-based payload retrieval. This pattern is commonly used for staging and executing malicious payloads directly from the internet.
Detects Azure AD user sign-ins from multiple distinct IP addresses or countries within a 1-hour window. This is a common heuristic used to identify potentially compromised credentials or impossible travel scenarios, where a single user account authenticates from geographically distant or disparate network locations in an unrealistic timeframe.
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