Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the creation of applications, service principals, or delegated permission grants in Entra ID where the initiating User-Agent string contains 'python-requests'. This pattern is often indicative of programmatic interaction with Microsoft Graph API using standard Python libraries, which may be associated with automated malicious registration chains or unauthorized application persistence.
Detects the creation of an application or service principal followed quickly (within 1 hour) by a tenant-wide delegated permission grant scoped to 'AllPrincipals' with 'openid' and 'profile' permissions. This sequence is a known indicator of automated rogue Enterprise Application setup, often used in consent phishing or persistence campaigns.
Detects the presence of specific ysoserial gadget chain strings (ActivitySurrogateSelector/ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck) indicative of deserialization attacks targeting Microsoft SharePoint via System.Web.UI.LosFormatter. This typically occurs in memory within w3wp.exe processes following an initial RCE exploit, such as those targeting EditingPageParser or ToolPane.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra authentication policy or external authentication method configurations, which may indicate an adversary attempting to establish a 'TrustSink' or alternate authentication persistence mechanism by registering a malicious OIDC provider or modifying authentication policy.
Detects user sign-ins that utilize an 'External Authentication Method' within 3 days of a password reset event. This behavior may indicate an adversary has successfully established persistence using a rogue authentication provider (e.g., via a TrustSink or similar malicious configuration) that survives password remediation and is capable of capturing or intercepting subsequent authentication tokens.
Detects incoming spearphishing emails that contain a ZIP archive attachment. The rule alerts if the archive contains an LNK file with a double extension (e.g., .pdf.lnk) or if the email subject contains specific social engineering lures related to food pricing or peace negotiations.
Detects the execution of a .vbs script file that contains '.pdf' in its filename, followed within 5 minutes by the execution of a WMI query via wscript.exe. This behavior is indicative of a malicious VBScript dropper attempting to perform system discovery using WMI.
Detects Azure AD sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was reportedly satisfied by an External Authentication Method (EAM) claim without evidence of a traditional secondary authentication challenge. This behavior is indicative of a 'TrustSink' technique where a rogue or compromised OIDC provider injects a spoofed assertion of MFA success into the authentication token.
Detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) loading WMI-related modules (wbemprox.dll, wbemcomn.dll, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of scripts attempting to query WMI for system information, environment configuration, or locale data, which is a common reconnaissance technique used by malware to identify the victim environment.
Detects the execution of a .vbs script file that contains '.pdf' in its filename, followed within 5 minutes by the execution of a WMI query via wscript.exe. This behavior is indicative of a malicious VBScript dropper attempting to perform system discovery using WMI.
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