Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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Detects modifications to domain federation settings or the addition of new identity providers in Entra ID occurring within 24 hours of a risky sign-in event by the same user account. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism involving MFA bypass via federated authentication, often referred to as a 'Golden SAML' or 'Federated Identity Backdoor' technique.
This rule detects a correlation between high-risk or anomaly-flagged sign-ins and subsequent changes to B2B guest invitation or tenant collaboration policies by the same user account within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary who has successfully hijacked a session (e.g., via AiTM or token replay) and is attempting to establish persistence or pivot by inviting external accounts or modifying B2B security settings.
Detects instances where a user grants OAuth consent to a non-verified application requesting high-privilege scopes related to mail access (Mail.Read, Mail.Send) and persistence (offline_access, full_access_as_app), which is a common indicator of consent phishing attacks.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in attempts that utilize legacy or basic authentication protocols (e.g., POP, IMAP, SMTP, Exchange ActiveSync) where Conditional Access MFA enforcement was not applied. This behavior indicates a potential attempt to circumvent modern authentication security controls, often associated with AiTM-facilitated account takeover or legacy protocol abuse.
Detects high-risk sign-in events in Azure AD that exhibit indicators of token replay, impossible travel, or anomalous sessions, while simultaneously leveraging certificate-based authentication or valid Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT). This combination often indicates an adversary is using stolen session material or PRTs to establish persistent, MFA-exempt access to the environment.
Detects successful sign-in events using the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (device code flow). This technique is frequently abused in AiTM/consent-phishing campaigns where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a device, effectively obtaining a fully authenticated session token. The rule identifies successful device-code authentications, which should be correlated with source IP discrepancies or unusual volume per tenant to identify malicious activity.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events where the session is marked as compliant or trusted by Conditional Access policies, but simultaneously flagged by Identity Protection as originating from an anonymized IP (e.g., residential proxy, VPN). This indicates an adversary has bypassed location-based Conditional Access controls, likely in the context of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying requests to common tunneling services (e.g., ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel) that include suspicious authentication or login-related URI paths, correlated with referrers from well-known email providers.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying requests to common tunneling services (e.g., ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel) that include suspicious authentication or login-related URI paths, correlated with referrers from well-known email providers.
Detects Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) phishing pages by inspecting web proxy or EDR-captured page content for malicious HTML/JS structures. The rule identifies fabricated browser chrome, such as fake address bars and title bars, initialized via window.open with specific dimensions, while ensuring the serving domain is not a known, legitimate identity provider.
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