Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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This rule detects instances where PowerShell is launched with hidden window arguments by explorer.exe or mshta.exe, and the command line indicates interactions with specific file extensions (.vbs, .ps1) located within the AppData directory. This pattern is often indicative of malicious script execution, such as those used in Konni malware campaigns to drop and execute payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of the VelvetCake variant of the Konni malware. The rule identifies the use of 'Net.WebClient.DownloadString' combined with 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) to execute scripts in memory, alongside specific command-line indicators such as the 'Areyou=cake' campaign marker or associated C2 domains.
Detects the execution of elevated cmd.exe processes (running with High or System integrity) spawned by parent processes originating from the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious installers, droppers, or payload execution where a staged binary in the user profile attempts to perform administrative actions.
Detects unauthorized access to critical Chromium-based browser credential databases (such as Login Data, Cookies, and History) by processes other than recognized browser executables. This behavior is indicative of credential-harvesting activity, specifically matching techniques employed by infostealers like RevStealer.
Detects the execution of a RevStealer native PE payload by an Electron-based loader (XabivSystem.exe). The rule identifies when the loader spawns an unsigned, detached process from a hidden, randomly-named subdirectory within the user's AppData folder. This process creation is a precursor to the malware's environment checks, anti-VM/sandbox gating, and CAPTCHA verification routines.
Detects a non-privileged user creating a new DLL file within the C:\ProgramData\CrossDevice\ directory on a system that has specific COM registration keys (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0} or {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}) pointing to potentially missing or hijacked InprocServer32 paths. This is a common technique used for COM Hijacking or Persistence via phantom DLL loading.
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage specific tooling for scheduled task enumeration, commonly used for discovery or persistence management. The rule flags usage of 'Get-AccessibleScheduledTask' in conjunction with flags associated with tools like NtObjectManager or OleViewDotNet.
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