Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,116 copies47 likes38,555 views
11,679 detections
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Detects modifications to the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key where values contain suspicious commands such as 'powershell', 'curl', or long base64-encoded strings, indicating potential command execution or persistence attempts.
This rule detects network activity associated with the NovaCookies Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing framework, specifically looking for traffic to domains with a .vu TLD, matching a specific URI pattern used for phishing lures in HTTP requests/responses, and related DNS queries.
This rule detects anomalous OAuth authorization requests to Microsoft and Google services where the 'redirect_uri' parameter points to suspicious external domains (specifically ending in .vu) or, in the case of silent Microsoft OAuth requests, points to domains outside of recognized Microsoft/Office 365 infrastructure. Such abuse is often indicative of OAuth consent phishing campaigns designed to steal application access tokens.
This rule detects phishing emails associated with the 'AnonyMousKIT' campaign that spoof Apple-related services ('Find My', 'Apple Support') using common adversary-controlled Gmail/iCloud addresses. The rule specifically targets institutional recipients in .gov, .edu, and .ac domains, identifying potential credential harvesting attempts despite the campaign's original consumer-focused pretext.
Detects outbound WebSocket connections from endpoints containing specific JWR phishing framework session tokens (JWRCID/JWRCVV) or known C2 path suffixes. This pattern indicates active communication with a malicious C2 server used for session hijacking or proxy-based phishing operations.
This rule monitors email traffic for attachments with suspicious file types (.htm, .xhtml, .svg, .zip) or specific filenames commonly used in phishing campaigns. It focuses on emails associated with Amazon SES infrastructure, often indicative of phishing attempts leveraging reputable infrastructure to deliver malicious content or stager files.
Detects network activity associated with Mirage2FA Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rules monitor for HTTP responses containing specific spoofed Microsoft 365 sign-in page content, DNS resolutions for known proxy-associated domain suffixes, and client requests fetching malicious loader scripts from suspected AiTM hosting infrastructure.
Detects potential token-replay persistence by identifying repeated 'MailItemsAccessed' events for the same user account from a non-native 'REST' and 'Firefox' client string, recurring at consistent ~30-minute intervals.
Detects network traffic associated with Mirage2FA Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS), including HTTP requests to specific URI patterns characteristic of their backend loader and DNS queries to known malicious domain families (cheecker.store and volatilesour.store), as well as direct TCP connections to identified hosting infrastructure.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kit exfiltration behavior. It correlates the initial victim geolocation lookup via 'api.ipgeolocation.io' with subsequent data exfiltration to the Telegram Bot API ('api.telegram.org') originating from the same host, indicating an automated sequence where victim context is gathered and then exfiltrated by the phishing kit.
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