Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,048 copies47 likes38,299 views
11,679 detections
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Detects the use of legitimate Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin) to delete volume shadow copies, clear backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent automatic system recovery. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware preparing for encryption by removing local recovery options.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns originating from the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe). This rule identifies the execution of various scripting engines or utilities like PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, and WScript/CScript when they are used with potentially malicious flags or command-line arguments, including encoded commands, hidden window styles, web-download strings, or direct HTA/scripting invocations, which are common indicators of malicious activity following potential user execution.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser profile files, such as login credentials, cookies, and session state files. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting or session theft by malicious software.
Detects the 'ClickFix' technique where a user copies a malicious payload and pastes it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R). The rule monitors for the creation of registry values under the RunMRU key followed closely by the execution of powershell.exe or cmd.exe initiated directly by explorer.exe, indicating an bypass of standard browser execution chains.
This rule detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving the legitimate Microsoft Defender binary 'mpextms.exe'. The rule triggers when 'mpextms.exe' is executed from a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and subsequently loads a specific 'endpointdlp.dll' from an equally suspicious location, indicating a potential attempt to masquerade malicious code execution behind a trusted process.
Detects a suspected exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-21412. The rule identifies a chain of execution involving an internet shortcut (.url) masquerading as a common file type (e.g., .jpg.url), which subsequently opens another shortcut to a WebDAV/IP host. This sequence is used to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections and execute a malicious batch script and Rundll32 process.
Detects the creation, update, or activation of an external Identity Provider (IdP) or federated trust configuration within the Okta environment. This activity may indicate an attempt to establish a rogue federation trust, which allows an adversary to perform cross-tenant impersonation and authenticate as any user by minting assertions signed by attacker-controlled keys.
Detects the creation of a new Entra ID application followed closely by high-privilege permission grants or consent. This is a common technique used by attackers to establish persistent access to cloud resources, such as mailboxes or sensitive data, via OAuth application backdoors.
Detects potential consent phishing attacks by identifying newly registered multi-tenant Azure AD applications that receive OAuth consent from end-users within a short timeframe (10 minutes) of application registration. The rule specifically flags consents requesting high-risk delegated scopes (e.g., Mail.Read, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, offline_access) where the application has not been verified by a trusted publisher.
Detects non-interactive Microsoft Entra ID service principal or managed identity sign-in events originating from an IP address, ASN, or country that has not been historically associated with that specific service principal. This behavior may indicate the use of compromised service principal credentials or stolen access tokens from adversary-controlled infrastructure.
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