Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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Detects outbound RDP-over-TLS connections using non-standard high-numbered ports (64350, 64330, 65535, 65111, 61256), characteristic of SilkParasite command and control infrastructure. The rules trigger on known C2 IP addresses and general suspicious RDP behavior on these specific ports.
Detects PNG image files containing an 'iTXt' metadata chunk and a specific byte marker (FF 89 AD 4A). This signature is characteristic of LausivLoader, which hides an encrypted payload within the image using steganographic techniques, intended for subsequent extraction via XOR decryption and DEFLATE decompression.
This rule detects suspicious UDP traffic directed at port 8800 targeting the Dahua P2P cloud relay interface. It specifically monitors for enumeration attempts against device serial numbers, which may be a precursor to unauthorized access or reconnaissance against vulnerable Dahua devices.
Detects potential cross-family Command and Control (C2) activity by correlating multiple network infrastructure indicators associated with the SilkParasite threat actor. The rule identifies source hosts that interact with at least two distinct indicator sets (specific malicious domains, shared TLS certificates, or cloned homepage content hashes) within a one-hour timeframe.
Detects attempts to patch ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) functions such as EtwEventWrite within the memory space of PowerShell or PWSH processes. This is a common technique used by attackers to suppress telemetry and evade security monitoring tools, often associated with bypassing AMSI/ETW logging mechanisms.
Detects attempts to patch ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) functions such as EtwEventWrite within the memory space of PowerShell or PWSH processes. This is a common technique used by attackers to suppress telemetry and evade security monitoring tools, often associated with bypassing AMSI/ETW logging mechanisms.
This rule monitors for suspicious credential-related activity targeting ONVIF interfaces on network devices (such as IP cameras). It detects a pattern where a successful 'global.login' RPC authentication is quickly followed (within 300 seconds) by commands or RPC methods related to credential dumping or user enumeration (e.g., OnvifUser, GetUsers). This sequence is indicative of an adversary using legitimate access to gain unauthorized information from a device.
Detects network communication to known SpiceRAT Command and Control (C2) IP addresses and DNS queries for known SpiceRAT-related domains. The rule identifies potential compromise by flagging outbound traffic or DNS resolutions associated with SpiceRAT infrastructure.
Detects the creation of a JavaScript file masquerading as a legitimate Microsoft PhotoEngine component ('PhotoStudio.js') within the '%LOCALAPPDATA%' directory. This behavior is associated with the LausivLoader malware, which uses this masquerading technique to evade detection.
This rule detects the LausivLoader initial-stage obfuscated JavaScript dropper. It identifies the malware either by specific file hashes (MD5/SHA256) or by detecting characteristic behaviors: small file size (<1MB), the presence of 'String.fromCharCode' obfuscation techniques, excessive junk comments, and supply-chain related lure strings.
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