Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects network activity associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, including QUIC C2 traffic using a self-signed 'RAT System' certificate, direct connections to a known C2 IP address (104.64.211.22), and DNS queries for the hardcoded C2 domain 'register.mediumser.com'.
Detects anomalous reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive Microsoft Graph control-plane endpoints, including directory roles, MFA settings, application registrations, service principals, and OAuth consent configurations. The rule identifies high-volume access across multiple distinct sensitive endpoints within a short time frame, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating infrastructure to identify opportunities for privilege escalation, persistence, or bypass of security controls.
Detects the execution of the Pester framework's Build.bat script, which is being abused as a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binary and Script) technique. This activity is typically characterized by being launched from an LNK file, often indicating a malicious dropper or secondary stage payload delivery.
This rule detects successful or attempted sign-ins to Microsoft Entra ID using the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow. This specific authentication flow is increasingly leveraged by adversaries in passkey-themed phishing campaigns to obtain valid access and refresh tokens without requiring direct credential or cookie theft. By monitoring for this protocol usage, security teams can identify potential attempts to bypass traditional authentication mechanisms.
This rule monitors for updates to a user's multi-factor authentication (MFA) configuration, specifically detecting when a new device is registered or activated. Attackers often register their own devices as MFA second factors to maintain persistent access to a compromised user account.
Detects instances where a user account registers the PhoneAppOTP MFA method and subsequently performs a successful authentication using that method within a defined window, followed by authentication attempts originating from non-browser, likely automated, UserAgents (e.g., node, python, axios). This pattern may indicate an adversary who has registered their own MFA device to gain persistent, automated access to the account.
This rule detects inbound phishing emails that leverage urgent security themes (e.g., passkey, SSO, or MFA updates) to lure users into clicking links. It correlates these emails with subsequent URL clicks and suspicious sign-in activity, such as MFA failures, which are indicative of an attempt to compromise credentials or bypass MFA.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the InprocServer32 registry key for the specific CLSID {2155fee3-2419-4373-b102-6843707eb41f}, a technique used by malware to achieve persistence by hijacking COM object instantiation to load a malicious DLL.
Detects network requests to a WordPress site's API path associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign. The rule monitors for specific URL parameters used by the campaign's backend to deliver malicious payload-fetching instructions to victims.
Detects instances where the Acronis backup agent or associated plugin processes spawn a shell (e.g., sh, bash, zsh, perl) under the root user context. This behavior is highly irregular and may indicate a compromised backup utility, the use of backup agent processes to execute arbitrary commands, or unauthorized privilege escalation.
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