
Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activity used for Command and Control (C2). It monitors DNS query traffic for indicators such as excessively long or high-entropy subdomain labels, the use of specific record types often used in tunneling (TXT and NULL records), and high volumes of DNS requests to a single parent domain from a specific host within a 10-minute window.
Detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, which is used to add file, folder, or extension exclusions to Microsoft Defender. Attackers frequently use this technique to prevent security software from scanning or detecting malicious files or directories.
Detects unauthorized access or file creation events targeting the 'tdata' directory, which stores local Telegram session and authentication data. The rule triggers when processes other than legitimate Telegram or system file explorers interact with these files, a common technique for session theft and account takeover.
Detects HTTP POST requests to a specific API endpoint (/api/adbk/upload) containing references to 'cert.pem' and 'private.key', indicating the exfiltration of sensitive cryptographic material by the RatHat malware.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior involving the Python interpreter spawning command-line shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe), or interactions (creation/modification) with a specific file at 'C:\ProgramData\ur.txt'. This behavior is often associated with post-exploitation activities, staging, or script-based execution of malicious payloads.
Detects anomalous configuration of Android devices by identifying instances where an accessibility service is granted combined with the enabling of wireless ADB debugging or ADB pairing code extraction. This behavior is often associated with malicious applications seeking unauthorized control or remote access to the device.
Detects the RatHat Android malware component using getevent or direct access to /dev/input event files to capture user PINs and patterns. The rule filters for processes running under UID 2000 (shell) or identifying as liblocal-service, which are consistent with the malware's keylogging behavior.
Detects the MovieReaper Stage-3 module which masquerades as Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) within the C:\ProgramData\Windows\Telemetry directory. The detection focuses on suspicious process execution from this directory and identifies instances where the process respawns itself, suggesting malicious activity post-UAC bypass.
This rule detects processes manually resolving API function addresses by traversing the Process Environment Block (PEB) Ldr structure or parsing module export tables. This technique is often used by malicious code to resolve Windows API functions dynamically without relying on standard LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress calls, effectively evading common API-hooking based monitoring.
This rule detects processes manually resolving API function addresses by traversing the Process Environment Block (PEB) Ldr structure or parsing module export tables. This technique is often used by malicious code to resolve Windows API functions dynamically without relying on standard LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress calls, effectively evading common API-hooking based monitoring.
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