Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,562 views
11,679 detections
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47
10
Detects the loading of the hostfxr.dll module, the presence of the DLLMemLoader string in command lines, or the execution of python or pythonw processes. These patterns are often associated with the loading of malicious assemblies or execution via scripting environments.
Detects the loading of the System.Management.Automation.dll (PowerShell assembly) by processes other than standard PowerShell executable files. This behavior often indicates an attempt to execute PowerShell code from a non-standard process, potentially to bypass security controls or obfuscate malicious activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden window, download strings, or invocation commands) initiated by Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for malicious scripts or droppers attempting to execute code covertly.
Detects a Node.js process executing a JavaScript file that spawns a secondary Node.js child process, followed immediately by the creation or modification of Windows Run registry keys for persistence. This sequence is indicative of malicious npm package activity where a secondary, hidden payload is downloaded and configured to execute upon system startup.
This rule detects network traffic originating from the local network to external destinations that exhibit characteristics associated with the Xray-core tool, specifically the use of a spoofed TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) of 'dl.google.com' paired with a server certificate that does not contain 'Google' in the subject. This technique is used to bypass network filters by masquerading command and control traffic as legitimate Google traffic.
This rule detects DNS queries for suspicious domains that mimic MFA or passkey registration portals. Such domains are often used in phishing campaigns to lure users into registering their credentials or security tokens on adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API containing hardcoded bot tokens and chat IDs associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package campaign. This indicates active data exfiltration or command-and-control communication.
This rule captures all successful authentication events with a populated source IP address. It serves as a foundational data collection rule for downstream security analytics, enabling the correlation of sign-in events against historical user geolocation baselines, ASN/ISP reputation feeds, and the detection of proxy or suspicious infrastructure usage.
Detects Microsoft Teams communication (calls, chats, messages) originating from a different tenant where the sender's display name is identified as IT Support, Help Desk, or similar. This behavior is indicative of external actors attempting to impersonate internal IT staff to facilitate social engineering or credential harvesting.
This rule detects potential Xray-core command-and-control (C2) activity where a client initiates a TLS connection using 'dl.google.com' as the Server Name Indication (SNI) but connects to a destination IP address that does not belong to Google's infrastructure. This technique is often used to mask C2 traffic as legitimate traffic to Google services.
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