Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the execution of 'reagentc.exe' with the '/disable' flag, which is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Adversaries often perform this action as part of an attempt to inhibit system recovery during ransomware operations or other destructive attacks.
Detects execution of long, obfuscated command strings initiated by Windows Explorer, often indicative of the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands bypassing execution policy to download or execute 'configuration.ps1' or communicate with known malicious infrastructure associated with the ClickFix campaign. The rule specifically looks for caret-based obfuscation, bypass switches, and known IOCs in the command line.
Detects the execution of the Windows cipher.exe utility with the /w flag, which is used to overwrite free space on a volume to permanently delete data, a common technique for anti-forensics and data destruction.
Detects potential anti-forensic activity involving the clearing of multiple Windows Event Logs within a short time frame using the 'wevtutil' utility. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to remove traces of post-compromise activity.
Detects the execution of the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) management tool, reagentc.exe, with the '/disable' flag. This action disables the built-in system recovery features, which is a common tactic used by adversaries to prevent system restoration after data destruction or ransomware attacks.
This rule monitors and logs all process creation events across the environment. It captures the execution of every new process, regardless of the parent image or the binary being executed. Due to its broad scope, this rule acts as an observational baseline or telemetry collector rather than a high-fidelity detection.
This rule detects potential anti-debugging behavior characteristic of the ConfuserEx packer. It identifies processes that repeatedly poll for debugger presence (using APIs such as Debugger.IsAttached, Debugger.IsLogging, or CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) at approximately 1-second intervals, culminating in a call to Environment.FailFast to terminate execution if a debugger is detected.
This rule detects potential anti-debugging behavior characteristic of the ConfuserEx packer. It identifies processes that repeatedly poll for debugger presence (using APIs such as Debugger.IsAttached, Debugger.IsLogging, or CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) at approximately 1-second intervals, culminating in a call to Environment.FailFast to terminate execution if a debugger is detected.
Detects the presence of MeshAgent remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, often used for persistence or unauthorized remote access. The rule correlates process execution indicators (including potential renaming of mvtcs.exe) with network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with Settra ransomware.
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