Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the use of the 'wevtutil.exe' command to clear Windows Event Logs where the command specifies a misspelled event log name, 'Microsoft-Windows-Defender/Operational' instead of the correct 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational'. This specific spelling error is associated with the Settra ransomware and indicates an unsuccessful attempt to clear Windows Defender logs.
Detects instances where explorer.exe spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated execution, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or bypass flags. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks where users are deceived into manually executing malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where explorer.exe spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated execution, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or bypass flags. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks where users are deceived into manually executing malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
Detects .NET malicious payloads associated with the StealC info-stealer by identifying anti-debugging and anti-analysis routines. The rule specifically looks for the usage of System.Diagnostics.Debugger methods (IsAttached, IsLogging), native debugger presence checks (IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent), and Environment.FailFast usage, often in combination with obfuscation markers like ConfuserEx.
Detects the creation of a specifically named shortcut (.lnk) file in the Windows Startup directory, a common persistence mechanism used by StealC/ClickFix malware variants.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the domain 'mnl.ac' and its associated infrastructure (IPs 149.255.35.135 and 45.74.7.27). The rules monitor for DNS queries, HTTP requests to fetch configuration files (configuration.ps1), and general outbound TCP connections that characterize the staging phase of the ClickFix PowerShell execution chain.
Detects the suspicious sequential execution of the 'wevtutil cl' command to clear multiple critical Windows Event Log channels, including security, system, and application logs. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic activities performed by adversaries, such as the Settra ransomware, to hinder incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects an AI coding assistant (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini CLI) attempting to checkout a Git repository and subsequently failing a manual verification check (git rev-parse HEAD) against an expected pinned commit hash. This behavior is indicative of a Plugin4Shell-style supply chain attack attempt, where an adversary tries to inject malicious code into a repository that the AI agent is instructed to use.
Detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies directly from memory or via Base64/encoded streams. This technique is commonly used by malicious payloads to execute shellcode, reflection-based attacks, or obfuscated scripts while minimizing their on-disk footprint.
Detects successful user authentication events originating from an external source IP address. This rule is intended to identify remote logins that can be correlated with RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) activity or other remote access patterns.
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