Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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This rule detects anomalous activity where users access Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) through identified anonymous proxy connections. It identifies potentially malicious exfiltration or bulk activity by flagging users who perform a high number of operations (1,000+ events) or download a significant volume of data (5GB+) within a 2-hour window.
This rule detects successful user authentication events within the environment. It acts as a base filter to capture login success, which can be further refined with context such as IP addresses or usernames to monitor for anomalous login patterns, though it does not inherently provide detection of complex attacks like session token hijacking on its own.
Detects instances where a user or entity accessing a file (download, access, or preview) originates from an IP address identified as an anonymous proxy. This rule is designed to be used with a downstream aggregation tool to identify potentially unauthorized data exfiltration or access via anonymization services.
This rule detects high-frequency interaction with the Exchange REST API originating from user agents identified as 'One Outlook Web', potentially indicative of automated password spraying or brute force attacks targeting cloud mailboxes. This rule identifies the underlying event pattern and should be paired with a scheduled/aggregation rule to detect the volume threshold (e.g., 500+ events per hour).
This rule detects DNS queries for domains associated with potential Command and Control (C2) activity, specifically 'service-nowinc.com' and 'domainlify.net'. These domains are flagged as suspicious, and their presence in DNS logs suggests potential malicious intent or communication with adversary infrastructure.
Detects a successful authentication event where standard endpoint identification metadata (endpoint name and IP address) is absent. This often indicates logs originating from sources without proper endpoint telemetry integration or potential attempts to obfuscate the source of an authentication request.
Detects messages sent through Microsoft Teams containing common phishing pretexts such as 'passkey', 'SSO update', or 'help desk'. This pattern is often used in credential harvesting campaigns where an attacker impersonates IT or support personnel to lure users into providing credentials or performing authentication-related actions.
This rule monitors DNS queries and HTTP traffic for indicators related to known phishing infrastructure impersonating passkey and SSO providers. The domains detected are associated with Storm-3121/3032 campaigns designed to facilitate credential or session harvesting.
This rule monitors DNS requests and network connections for activity targeting domains identified as malicious: 'gg-steelseries.com.cn' and 'org-bcut.com.cn'. These domains are often associated with command and control infrastructure or malware distribution, and their presence in network logs is a high-fidelity indicator of a potential compromise.
Detects the registration of a new MFA authentication method (software OTP token or authenticator app) on an Azure AD account, specifically when triggered with 'NO_DEVICE' or 'NO_DEVICE_TOKEN' markers and 'SoftwareTokenActivated' tags. This behavior is indicative of potential attacker persistence following account compromise where a new MFA device is added for future access.
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