Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,571 views
11,679 detections
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Detects DNS resolutions, TLS SNI, and HTTP host requests to known malicious phishing domains impersonating passkey and SSO infrastructure, often associated with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 activities.
Detects high-volume access to Exchange Online mailboxes by a single user from a single IP address using the 'One Outlook Web' application ID, potentially indicating unauthorized automated mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of an administrator-level user account in a WordPress environment within a one-hour window after the 'Admin Menu Editor Pro' plugin is updated to known trojanized versions (2.35 or 2.36), which is indicative of a backdoor installation.
Detects pre-encryption activity typical of the CRPx0 ransomware, involving the destruction of Windows Volume Shadow Copies, Windows Backup Catalogs, or macOS Time Machine snapshots using system utilities such as vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic, or tmutil. This behavior is indicative of an imminent encryption phase.
Detects the creation of a large file (exceeding 4MB) named 'WindowsUpdate.log' on the system. This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt where a malicious PE DLL is disguised with the extension of a known legitimate log file, a technique observed in the CRPx0 ClickFix lure to evade security inspection.
Detects the creation of property list (.plist) files within /Library/LaunchDaemons/ or /Library/LaunchAgents/ directories, which is a common persistence mechanism for macOS malware, including cross-platform ransomware variants like CRPx0. The rule filters out events initiated by the system installer process to reduce noise.
Detects the creation of new executable files (DLL or EXE) that contain a certificate subject string referencing 'Microsoft' but are located outside of the standard 'C:\Windows\' directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass trust validation mechanisms by creating binaries with self-signed, fake Microsoft certificates, a technique observed in the CRPx0 builder toolset to evade EDR and AV inspection.
Detects evidence of sandbox or virtualization evasion by identifying discovery commands that query WMI hypervisor classes or common virtual machine hardware strings. This activity is considered a precursor (pre-detonation check) when followed by the execution of encoded PowerShell commands or Python scripts on the same host, which is characteristic of the CRPx0 ClickFix attack chain.
Detects evidence of sandbox or virtualization evasion by identifying discovery commands that query WMI hypervisor classes or common virtual machine hardware strings. This activity is considered a precursor (pre-detonation check) when followed by the execution of encoded PowerShell commands or Python scripts on the same host, which is characteristic of the CRPx0 ClickFix attack chain.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands containing indicators of AMSI or ETW unhooking (e.g., references to amsi.dll, AmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, or VirtualProtect). This activity is commonly associated with attackers attempting to bypass endpoint security telemetry and antimalware scanning mechanisms prior to executing malicious payloads.
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