Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,571 views
11,679 detections
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Detects instances where Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) spawns common command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, mshta.exe, cmd.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments indicative of fileless execution, obfuscation, or remote payload retrieval.
Detects DLL search-order hijacking where potentially malicious or unauthorized versions of common application DLLs (such as those from Opera or Qt5 framework) are loaded from non-standard locations like %TEMP%, %AppData%, or user-writable directories instead of their legitimate installation paths. This technique is often associated with loaders like HijackLoader/CastleLoader to execute arbitrary code within the context of a legitimate process.
Detects the presence of HijackLoader/IDAT Loader payloads disguised as non-PNG files. The rule identifies files containing concatenated PNG IDAT chunks that do not start with a valid PNG magic header, followed by a canonical IEND terminator, characteristic of steganographic data storage used to deploy the HijackLoader toolkit.
Detects high-volume file modification events resulting in files renamed with the .inc extension, which is a characteristic behavior of the INC ransomware strain. The rule monitors for more than 50 such modifications on a single host within a 10-minute window, serving as an indicator of active encryption and potential ransomware impact.
Detects anomalous PowerShell activity associated with the EKZ Stealer, characterized by a multi-stage chain involving file download, hidden process execution, temporary file staging, base64 encoding, and exfiltration via HTTP POST requests, followed by cleanup of logs.
Detects the creation or modification of a file named 'log.txt' within a 'ProgramData' directory by the 'FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe' process. This pattern may indicate the diagnostic logging activity of the FortiEndpoint patch mechanism.
This rule detects the creation of unauthorized technician accounts in the SimpleHelp RMM platform that follow an OIDC authentication bypass pattern (CVE-2026-48558). It correlates server logs indicating 'New Anon' registration activity with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created), specifically filtering for accounts that do not belong to trusted corporate domains.
This rule detects successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) logons (Event ID 4624 with Logon Type 10) and the execution of the Remote Desktop Connection client (mstsc.exe). It monitors for signs of remote interactive access to windows endpoints, which can indicate unauthorized access or legitimate administrative activity.
Detects the execution of Mimikatz with command line arguments indicative of credential dumping, specifically DCSync attacks or dumping LSASS memory for passwords. The rule filters out processes signed by Microsoft to reduce noise.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe by processes that are not digitally signed by Microsoft Corporation, as well as the loading of taskschd.dll by non-standard/unsigned processes. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or unauthorized task scheduling activity.
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