
Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,571 views
11,679 detections
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This rule detects persistence mechanisms established by either modifying common Windows 'Run' registry keys or by placing executable files within user Startup folders. These techniques are commonly used by malware and adversaries to ensure their code executes automatically upon user logon.
Detects credential harvesting behavior by non-browser processes attempting to access browser credential storage (Login Data/Local State files) and identifies execution of the masquerading binary 'FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe' and the creation of the 'log.txt' artifact in C:\ProgramData used by the EKZ Stealer.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed via the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe), utilizing common download-cradle patterns (IEX/Invoke-Expression and Invoke-RestMethod) typically associated with ClickFix clipboard-hijacking social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of the FortigateSniffer binary or the use of the 'diagnose sniffer packet' command on FortiGate devices, which are used to passively intercept network traffic including authentication protocols like RADIUS, NTLM, and Kerberos.
Detects the loading of the known vulnerable OPSWAT AppRemover driver (pcdhost.sys). This driver is often abused in Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) attacks, such as those performed by ResiLoader, to execute code in kernel mode and bypass security controls, ultimately allowing the termination of protected security processes.
This rule detects potential network port scanning behavior by identifying a host that initiates connections to both ports 3333 and 3334 on a remote destination within a short time window (15 seconds). This specific pattern is often associated with automated discovery or lateral movement tools probing for specific services.
This rule monitors for a suspicious execution pattern where a browser (Chrome or Edge) is launched with specific command-line flags ('--no-first-run', '--disable-gpu', 'about:blank') by a non-standard parent process, followed shortly by the loading of the 'elevation_service.exe' from 'services.exe' and the loading of 'DPAPI.dll' by the browser process. This sequence is often associated with automated browser credential dumping activities, where attackers attempt to bypass UI requirements or programmatically extract secrets from the browser's credential storage.
Detects recurring connection patterns characteristic of the SnappyClient RAT, specifically monitoring for heartbeat-like beaconing at regular intervals on ports 3333/tcp and 3334/tcp. The rule correlates traffic across both ports from the same device to the same destination to identify potential command-and-control communication.
Detects high-volume unauthenticated API queries against a ServiceNow instance by a Guest user. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information, such as ticket data, configuration secrets, or employee records, via the 'related_list_edit' REST endpoint or standard table APIs.
Detects potentially malicious activity within Microsoft 365 involving the creation of inbox rules for message forwarding/redirection, modifications to mailbox forwarding configurations, or mass outbound email sending. These actions are common indicators of persistent access, email exfiltration, or automated reconnaissance after account compromise.
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