Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,574 views
11,679 detections
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Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that utilize the Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods namespace to resolve native NT API functions (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, etc.) and perform reflective code loading of a headerless PE payload from a staging directory (C:\ProgramData\wt1). This activity is associated with UAC-0226/GIFTEDCROOK threat campaigns.
Detects the execution of Nishang's Invoke-PowerShellTcp reverse shell script via PowerShell, typically executed via IEX (Invoke-Expression) to load the payload directly into memory, which is a common post-exploitation technique often performed following an AMSI bypass.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (via schtasks.exe or at.exe) directly by known AI agent developer binaries (e.g., claude, cursor, aider) or indirectly via command shells spawned by these agents. This behavior may indicate an AI agent being leveraged to establish persistence or automate malicious actions on a host.
Detects persistence mechanisms frequently associated with SharkLoader and Cobalt Strike. The rule monitors for scheduled task creation using specific suspicious naming patterns, tasks pointing to SystemSettings.exe in non-standard directories (AppData/ProgramData), high-frequency task triggers, and registry run key modifications targeting SystemSettings.exe in similar suspicious paths.
Detects instances where explorer.exe (acting as a parent process due to a user executing commands via the Win+R Run dialog) spawns common command-line interpreters or script hosts (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as encoded commands, downloader patterns, or file execution proxies. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious payloads from a webpage into the Run dialog.
Detects rapid execution of multiple network reconnaissance commands on a single host. Adversaries often use these built-in utilities (e.g., ipconfig, net, arp) to map an environment's network configuration, users, shares, and service structure after initial compromise to inform subsequent lateral movement.
This rule detects modifications to critical Windows registry keys associated with disabling security features (Microsoft Defender, WDigest credential storage) or establishing persistence via Image File Execution Options (IFEO). These modifications are often performed by adversaries to impair defensive monitoring, bypass credential protections, or execute malicious code when specific processes start.
Detects the execution of specific suspicious processes (Mixed Reality.exe, COU_ITR-1_to_4_AY2026-27.exe) or svchost.exe processes spawned from Windows Media Player paths, followed by suspicious loading of amsi.dll. This behavior is associated with the DragonReturn DLL sideloading and evasion chain.
Detects the use of the Windows service control utility (sc.exe) to install or manage a malicious service named 'MixedSvc'. This activity, which involves pointing the service executable to 'Mixed Reality.exe' located in the Windows Media Player directory, is a persistence technique observed in Operation DragonReturn attributed to the Silver Fox threat group.
Detects the download of potential steganographic image files (specifically .jpg extensions) from known malicious IP addresses, followed by the creation of a non-Microsoft-signed image file in the C:\Windows directory by the same process storyline. This behavior suggests the download and extraction of an embedded malicious payload.
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