Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,585 views
11,679 detections
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Detects the execution of system information discovery utilities (systeminfo, ipconfig, whoami, net) by specific process names (BQT.exe or start.exe), followed by a DNS request to api.telegram.org within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of malware performing reconnaissance and using Telegram for command and control or data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for suspicious administrative activity on Windows systems, specifically detecting the creation of new local user accounts (excluding machine accounts) and the addition of users to the local Administrators group.
Detects unauthorized execution of native binaries initiated by npm during the package installation process. This rule targets the IronWorm supply-chain campaign, where compromised npm packages utilize preinstall hooks or node-gyp build processes to execute malicious binaries (often Rust-based) from unconventional paths within the package directory.
Detects unexpected child process creation spawned by npm or node.exe that is characteristic of the IronWorm Rust-based infostealer. This rule monitors for malicious npm preinstall or postinstall hooks executing common living-off-the-land binaries (like curl, powershell, or regsvr32) from within a node_modules directory structure, common in supply chain compromise scenarios.
Detects the use of the 'git commit --date' flag to manually set commit timestamps, a technique utilized by the IronWorm campaign to backdate malicious commits and manipulate repository history to appear benign or legacy-originating.
Detects the loading of an eBPF rootkit by Node.js or NPM processes. This rule monitors for file creation events within the /sys/fs/bpf/ directory triggered by these processes, which is a known behavior of the IronWorm infostealer attempting to hide processes and network connections.
Detects suspicious git commit activity associated with the IronWorm campaign. The rule monitors for git operations involving backdated commits or force-pushes, particularly those using a specific noreply email address or common maintenance commit messages, which are indicative of supply-chain compromise and timestomping techniques within npm repositories.
Detects instances where a Node.js process accesses, creates, or modifies sensitive files such as SSH private keys, AWS credentials, or application configuration files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .docker/config.json). This behavior is often indicative of credential theft or unauthorized configuration access by a compromised Node.js application.
This rule detects various stages of exploitation associated with the CVE-2026-45257 'BUMSRAKETE' vulnerability, which targets FreeBSD kernels. It monitors for the execution of exploit binaries, compilation of source code related to the exploit, the presence of specific staging files in temporary directories, and the subsequent spawning of shells by the exploit process. It also identifies command-line arguments indicative of BUMSRAKETE activity.
Detects the execution of a malicious npm package disguised as '@withgoogle/stitch-sdk'. The package uses a 'preinstall.js' script to harvest sensitive developer credentials, including API keys, Git credentials, SSH keys, and Docker tokens, and attempts to exfiltrate this data to an attacker-controlled domain (stitch-production.org).
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