Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,586 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
This rule detects network connections or DNS requests to the domain 'mitarchive.info', which is associated with known malicious activity. Monitoring for traffic to this domain can help identify hosts that may be compromised or attempting to communicate with an attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects DNS resolution and network connections to known infrastructure associated with the StegoAd campaign, including exfiltration (mitarchive.info) and C2 (liveupdt.com, dealctr.com, ipaglov.com) domains. The rule monitors activity from common browser and scripting engine processes.
Detects unauthorized credential dumping attempts against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The rule identifies suspicious use of system utilities like 'comsvcs.dll' via rundll32, cross-process handle access by unauthorized processes, and the execution of offensive security tools such as lsassy and crackmapexec.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by monitoring for suspicious browser process spawning scripting child processes (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, etc.), unusual DNS requests to Microsoft login/Graph API endpoints from scripting hosts, and direct non-browser access to browser cookie database files.
Detects reconnaissance activity associated with Akira ransomware, including PowerShell-based share enumeration (Invoke-ShareFinder, Get-NetShare), execution of unauthorized network scanning tools (e.g., SoftPerfect NetScan from non-standard paths), and the use of 'net view /domain' commands to identify accessible network resources.
This rule monitors system activity for the presence of specific file names, paths, and image loads associated with known malware families, specifically BlueHammer, RedSun, UnDefend, Bluekit, and libpwn. The rule evaluates process creation, file creation, and DLL load events across EDR and endpoint logs to identify potentially malicious indicators.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity on Linux-based SD-WAN appliances (e.g., vManage, vBond, vSmart) including unauthorized file deletion, log tampering, and credential backup manipulation. It specifically flags operations like removing system logs, deleting configuration/tenant files, or copying sensitive files like /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, which are common indicators of post-exploitation activity or attempts to hide malicious footprints.
Detects potential lateral movement by the Akira ransomware group. The rule triggers when a Windows interactive RDP logon (LogonType 10, NTLM V2) occurs on a target host while the source host simultaneously exhibits process execution of the 'AdgNsy.exe' file, which is a known agent associated with Akira's command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects the execution of consent.exe from a specific Bumblebee loader installation path (ApplicationInstallationFolder_11) within the user's temporary directory. This activity is indicative of the Bumblebee loader, which utilizes DLL side-loading of a malicious msimg32.dll and incorporates locale-based checks to evade execution in certain regions.
Detects the execution of the VSCode npm infostealer campaign, specifically identifying the usage of a fake eslint loader named 'vscode-eioesocxetd.js'. This malware performs sandbox and environment checks for CI/CD, cloud, and containerized environments (AWS, Azure, GCP, GitHub Codespaces, etc.) to evade analysis before proceeding to deploy infostealers or backdoors.
Page 711 of 1168