Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the execution of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) related processes, which can be used to execute Linux commands and scripts on a Windows host, potentially allowing adversaries to bypass Windows-specific security controls.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows DllHost.exe process creates or modifies executable or script files in common directories frequently used for staging malicious payloads, such as public folders, temporary directories, and program data. This behavior is often associated with process injection or side-loading techniques where a trusted process is abused to drop secondary malicious files.
This rule monitors for suspicious activities related to Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) and authentication daemons. It detects unauthorized modifications to PAM configuration and shared object files, unexpected child processes spawned by sshd, the use of LD_PRELOAD in authentication contexts, and the tracing of authentication binaries (e.g., sshd, login, sudo) via strace.
This rule monitors for process creations spawned by common web application servers (e.g., nginx, python, java, php) where the command line arguments contain indicators of a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempt. Specifically, it looks for suspicious URL schemes (file:, gopher:, dict:, ftp:), potential authority confusion patterns (targeting cloud metadata IPs), and encoded directory traversal characters when paired with sensitive paths like 'etc' or 'proc'.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via WScript or CScript (WshShell.Run) with hidden window flags, involving the use of 'certutil' to decode a staged payload located in a ProgramData directory. This pattern is characteristic of Kimsuky loader activity.
Detects anomalous high-rate outbound network scanning activity (targeting numerous distinct destination IPs and ports) originating from internal SOHO or edge devices (e.g., Cisco, Ubiquiti, Draytek hardware). This pattern is consistent with compromised devices acting as nodes within a botnet, such as the JDY cluster, conducting reconnaissance.
Detects the registration of a Cloud Files sync root provider with the name 'SERIOUSLYMSFT', a hardcoded value in the RedSun exploit (CVE-2026-41091).
Detects network enumeration tools (netstat.exe, ss.exe) when executed by a suspicious process or from directories associated with the JFMBackdoor malware infection (e.g., fltMC.exe or common staging paths like C:\ProgramData\ and \temp\).
Detects attempts to delete or clear Linux system logs using common utilities (rm, shred, truncate, echo, cat) targeting critical log paths such as /var/log/syslog, /var/log/messages, and other authentication or kernel logs. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to remove evidence of their actions from the local system.
Detects the use of fltMC.exe to spawn service control commands (sc.exe) or command processor (cmd.exe) with arguments for starting, stopping, creating, deleting, or configuring Windows services. This activity may indicate an attempt to manipulate drivers or services to impair system defenses or achieve persistence.
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