Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,591 views
11,679 detections
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Detects execution of script interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or HTML Application host (mshta.exe) when spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Winword, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) or mshta.exe. This pattern is characteristic of the Gamaredon group's spear-phishing delivery chains (e.g., PteroOdd, PteroDum) that utilize macro-enabled documents or malicious HTA files to execute malicious VBScript.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe is spawned by PowerShell.exe, specifically targeting patterns often associated with malware downloaders and stage-two payload execution. The rule filters out common system DLLs and legitimate rundll32 usage to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands commonly used for host reconnaissance (e.g., whoami, ipconfig, net group, systeminfo) combined with the use of PowerShell to perform an HTTP POST request to a suspicious external IP address (202.182.102.5), suggesting post-compromise reconnaissance data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the schtasks utility that masquerade as legitimate update services (MicrosoftEdgeUpdate or GoogleUpdaterTaskSystem). These tasks are configured to run at logon with highest privileges, specifically aiming to persist the TinyRCT backdoor (associated with files such as vmwared.exe or vmtools.exe) in ProgramData directories.
Detects the use of WinRAR (rar.exe) to archive files containing web server or database source code. The detection monitors for common staging flags (-k, -r, -s, -m1), password protection (-hp), or output paths indicative of staging activity (e.g., to a 'backup' directory or 'web.rar'), originating from standard Windows program file paths.
Detects unprivileged processes creating a new user namespace (CLONE_NEWUSER) followed by a network namespace (CLONE_NEWNET) and modifying procfs mapping files (uid_map, gid_map). This sequence is characteristic of the exploitation staging phase for CVE-2026-43503 (DirtyClone) to gain CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges and overwrite the page cache.
Detects evidence of log deletion, logrotate configuration modification, or syslog daemon termination (rsyslog, syslog-ng, journald) occurring within 30 minutes of suspicious child process activity from common web application interpreters (e.g., python, node, java, php). This correlation pattern is a strong indicator of post-exploitation activity aimed at clearing tracks or impairing host logging services.
Detects potential unauthorized cryptocurrency mining activity by correlating process execution, network connections to known mining pools or C2 IPs, and the presence of known miner binaries in temporary directories. The rule calculates a confidence score based on the overlap of these behavioral indicators.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events on Linux where a non-root process creates a user namespace followed within 5 minutes by either network XFRM policy manipulation or the loading of specific kernel modules (esp4, esp6, or rxrpc). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to bypass kernel security restrictions or establish unauthorized encrypted tunnels.
Detects the configuration of network tunnels or IPsec-related settings using tools such as ip, setkey, racoon, or strongswan by a non-root user. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized tunnel establishment or lateral movement activities where a standard user attempts to bypass network controls.
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