Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,591 views
11,679 detections
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This rule detects the loading of '7z.dll' or 'normaliz.dll' from locations outside of standard Windows system directories (System32, SysWOW64) or Program Files. It identifies instances where these DLLs are loaded from potentially suspicious paths, such as the user's AppData directory, or where the loaded module is unsigned or carries an invalid digital signature. This pattern is commonly indicative of binary masquerading or side-loading techniques.
This rule detects instances where msiexec.exe spawns cmd.exe to execute a batch file located within the user's AppData\Roaming directory. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity where msiexec is abused as a proxy for command execution, often used by malware to launch secondary stages from user-writable directories.
This rule detects the execution of Impacket toolkit modules (such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, secretsdump.py) via EDR process events, as well as potential lateral movement patterns identified by NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to ADMIN$ or IPC$ shares. This combination of signals is indicative of credential dumping, remote service execution, or lateral movement using techniques often employed by the Impacket suite.
This rule detects potential Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) exploitation attempts by identifying JNDI injection patterns in web request headers, process command lines, and syslog messages. It further identifies suspicious outbound network callbacks to known malicious infrastructure associated with these exploitation attempts.
This rule detects modifications to the Winlogon Shell registry key or a specific 'MyStartupScript' registry Run key. These locations are commonly abused by the LCRYX ransomware to establish persistence via VBScript or script host execution. The rule monitors both EDR registry events and Sysmon event ID 13 for suspicious changes performed by script host processes or targeting these specific persistence locations.
Detects the post-download execution stage of the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting Windows RAT campaign. Covers three indicators: (1) wscript.exe executing a .vbs file from %TEMP% or subdirectory (e.g. update.vbs from winPatch), (2) chost.exe or any process launching loader.py as a command-line argument, (3) cmd.exe using tar to extract a .zip archive from %TEMP%.
This rule monitors incoming email events for a specific domain or sender address, detecting instances where emails pass DKIM validation but fail DMARC and SPF checks while simultaneously being flagged as spam by the email security solution. This pattern is indicative of potential spoofing or unauthorized email activity.
Detects incoming emails purportedly from a specific domain ('gasparinutrition.com') that exhibit signs of spoofing or malicious activity. The rule looks for DMARC failures, DKIM misalignment, and presence of specific document attachments or subject lines (e.g., 'Distribution Settlement Agreement') that mimic business correspondence often used in social engineering or phishing campaigns.
Detects a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2026-42824, involving a parameter-to-prompt injection in M365 Copilot to extract sensitive data identifiers, followed by an exfiltration attempt via a Bing Search-by-Image SSRF request.
Detects a process running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM that was spawned by a parent process not belonging to known legitimate SYSTEM-spawning Windows components. This behavioral pattern is a strong indicator of local privilege escalation (LPE), consistent with techniques such as CVE-2026-41091 (RedSun) and similar LPE exploits.
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