Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects execution chains where Outlook launches a VBScript file that subsequently invokes PowerShell with encoded commands, characteristic of Gamaredon (ACTINIUM) threat activity. Additionally, it identifies the creation of VBScript/VBE files in temporary directories, which is consistent with the deployment of PteroVDoor or PteroPSDoor loaders.
Detects instances where the WinRAR process (winrar.exe) spawns common script interpreters or command-line shells, including mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code embedded in or extracted from a compressed archive.
Detects periodic beaconing behavior associated with a Lambsys Go-based implant communicating with a specific C2 IP address (83.142.209.214) over HTTP. The rule identifies POST requests to specific paths ('/status.php' or '/setup_status.php') using the 'Go-http-client/1.1' User-Agent, with evidence of repeated connection attempts.
Detects the BQTLock malware's User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique. This technique involves modifying the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command to hijack the EventViewer COM object. Subsequently, eventvwr.exe is launched, which auto-elevates and executes BQT.exe, bypassing UAC.
Detects the creation of a file named 'bootTel.dat' directly in the root directory (C:\). This file name and location can be associated with certain malware or suspicious activities, as it's not a typical system file.
This rule monitors for the execution of the 'bun.exe' process specifically when it originates from a Node.js-related context (such as npm, node-gyp, or binding.gyp execution) or exhibits suspicious behaviors like executing payloads from /tmp directories. This pattern is often associated with supply chain attacks or malicious package execution within JavaScript development environments.
Detects outbound network connections to 'stitch-production.org' or connections by node/bun runtime processes to GitHub API or 'stitch-production.org', which may indicate command and control communication or data exfiltration.
This rule detects PowerShell activity where commands are used to perform reconnaissance (e.g., whoami, ipconfig, or network group enumeration) and the output is exfiltrated or sent via a POST request to a specific external IP address (202.182.102.5).
Detects malicious behavior attributed to the Miasma/TonRAT malware, specifically targeting node.js or bun.exe runtime environments. The rule identifies suspicious network connections to command and control (C2) domains, access to sensitive developer credential files (e.g., .npmrc, .aws/credentials), execution of identified credential-harvesting functions in process command lines, and the execution of specific suspicious preinstall scripts.
Detects unauthorized npm package publish events or file uploads associated with compromised maintainer accounts (czirker, llxlr) and specific malicious packages linked to the Miasma Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack.
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