Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,597 views
11,679 detections
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Detects execution of tools and scripts known for exploiting the Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability, including zerologon_tester.py, zerologon.py, and Impacket-based Netlogon authentication abuse. The rule monitors command-line activity for these indicators, excluding processes signed by Microsoft.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory. The rule monitors for execution of known credential-dumping tools (e.g., secretsdump), cross-process access to lsass.exe, suspicious process command-line arguments (e.g., comsvcs, MiniDump), and the creation of files indicative of credential theft (e.g., lsass.dmp, wceaux.dll).
Detects the execution of portable Impacket tools ('mini_imp'), including psexec.py, secretsdump.py, and ntlmrelayx.py. This activity is indicative of potential credential harvesting, remote service execution, or NTLM relay attacks, as observed in the MexicanMafia 'Operation Escaneo' campaign.
This rule correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within a 24-hour window, indicating a multi-stage intrusion typically associated with ransomware campaigns. The detection chain includes initial credential harvesting (using tools like Impacket, BloodHound, or potential agent drops), followed by defense dismantlement (deleting shadow copies, terminating security processes, and disabling the firewall), and ending with system auditing/recovery sabotage.
Detects file creations (images), image loads, and process execution activity originating from or related to the 'SCef.WindowsAdapter' directory. This directory is often associated with specific third-party application behaviors and should be monitored for potential anomalous execution or staging of suspicious files.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting activity associated with the Hannibal Stealer. It looks for non-standard processes (processes other than the browsers themselves) that access sensitive browser credential stores (like 'Login Data', 'cookies.sqlite', or 'key4.db') and correlate these file access events with the loading of 'bcrypt.dll' or 'CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess.dll', which are often used for decryption or browser automation/sub-processes during credential theft.
Detects a sequence of actions characteristic of LCRYX ransomware: disabling Windows Defender via registry modification, disabling the Windows Firewall via netsh, and terminating common antivirus processes (e.g., MsMpEng, avp, vsserv) within a 10-minute window on the same host.
Detects attempts by scripts (spawned via wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe) to disable or interfere with security products. This includes disabling Microsoft Defender via registry modifications or PowerShell commands, disabling the Windows Firewall using netsh, and terminating or stopping security software processes and services using taskkill, sc, or net.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe with the /elevated command-line argument, which is a known technique for bypassing User Account Control (UAC) or invoking administrative tasks via COM object elevation.
This rule detects the execution of common security reconnaissance and enumeration tools (e.g., subfinder, nuclei, gobuster, httpx) or suspicious Python scripts typically associated with scanning and discovery activities. It uses Sysmon Process Creation events and flags instances where high-volume scanning parameters are used or where multiple distinct tools or executions are observed on a single host.
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