Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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This rule monitors for the execution of the RustDesk remote access tool and specifically tracks any child processes spawned by it. Detecting child processes spawned by legitimate remote access tools like RustDesk is a high-fidelity signal for identifying post-compromise activity, such as command execution or lateral movement.
Detects network activity associated with Djinn Stealer malware, identifying either direct connections to a known command-and-control (C2) server or HTTP exfiltration attempts using a characteristic User-Agent string and binary content type.
This rule detects the extraction of a file from an archive (RAR) using 7-Zip utilities, followed by the execution of a file (exe, dll, js, etc.) from the Temp or Downloads directory within 120 seconds. This pattern is commonly observed during the execution phase of a malicious payload delivered via archives.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the 'SmartWindow' browser exploitation technique, specifically: Firefox communicating with the local SmartWindow PoC C2 API on port 8765, Firefox spawning unexpected child processes, or unauthorized processes accessing Firefox's 'places.sqlite' database to harvest browsing history or private session data.
Detects persistent outbound network connections to known SystemBC (Coroxy) C2 infrastructure and Tor gateway IP addresses. The rule identifies suspicious beaconing behavior characterized by repeated connections over ports 4001 or 4002, originating from processes in user-writable directories, and correlates these with process lineage from common office applications or browsers.
Detects suspicious behavior originating from OpenVPN processes, including spawning command-line interpreters (cmd, powershell, etc.), utilization of server-pushed configuration directives that trigger script execution (e.g., up, down, or route-up hooks), and the creation of scripts or executables within temporary directories.
Detects Node.js processes executing with suspicious command-line arguments that include specific file extensions (.woff, .woff2, .svg, .jpeg, .png, .dict) or known suspicious file names associated with potential malicious activity or obfuscation.
Detects execution of common discovery utilities (whoami, ipconfig, net, etc.) by the suspicious process 'MediumInstStart.exe', often indicative of an adversary performing reconnaissance after initial access or persistence.
Detects post-staging cleanup activities consistent with Mustang Panda (TA416) operations. This includes the deletion of staging files using Windows cmd.exe, specific file deletion events within the C:\ProgramData\IDM\logs\ directory, and the use of attrib commands to hide directories associated with known staging locations.
Detects the creation or modification of specific suspicious files (e.g., MediumInstStart.exe, SolidPDFCreator.dll, pcl2bmp.exe, ctxmui.dll) in common temporary or world-writable directories like ProgramData or Users/Public/Documents, which are often used by adversaries for staging tools or malware components.
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