Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the execution of known Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin) used to delete Volume Shadow Copies or the backup catalog, a common technique employed by ransomware to prevent system recovery. It also detects processes named locker.exe, commonly associated with ransomware binaries.
Detects the execution of Ghostscript (gswin64c.exe, gswin32c.exe, or gs) spawned by ImageMagick binaries (magick.exe, convert.exe, or identify.exe) where the Ghostscript binary is located outside of standard program installation directories. This behavior is indicative of potential delegate hijacking or exploitation attempts where an adversary provides a malicious Ghostscript binary to ImageMagick.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving Docker containers, specifically focusing on path traversal attempts via the 'docker cp' command, execution of potential proof-of-concept scripts, or the creation of specific marker files indicating attempts to interact with or escape from the containerized environment to the underlying host.
This rule detects activities associated with a specific malicious browser extension, including the presence of its files on disk, execution of browsers with the extension ID in the command line, and network connections to known malicious or typosquatted domains (perplexity-ai.online, extension.tilda.ws) used for C2 or exfiltration.
Detects DNS queries to known StegoAd command-and-control domains 'liveupdt.com' and 'dealctr.com'. These domains are used by the StegoAd campaign to deliver steganographic payloads and push malicious JavaScript to compromised browser extensions.
Detects anomalous automated enumeration of Microsoft Graph API user objects followed by keyword-based searches for sensitive HR, finance, and payroll-related information. This pattern is characteristic of post-compromise reconnaissance activities where an attacker leverages an existing session token to identify targets for further data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous, non-interactive Microsoft Graph sign-in activity consistent with the Payroll Pirate session hijacking campaign. The rule flags instances where the same user account authenticates via Microsoft Graph using the 'Firefox/131.0' user agent from multiple distinct source IP addresses within a 6-hour window, indicating potential stolen session token replay from distributed proxy infrastructure.
This rule detects potential lateral phishing attempts originating from a compromised Microsoft 365 account. It flags outbound internal emails containing payroll-related keywords, such as direct deposit or salary redirection, which are sent to HR or finance departments. This activity is correlated with recent mailbox rule modifications (like transport or inbox rules) by the same user, a technique often used by threat actors to hide communications or exfiltrate data, consistent with identified campaigns like Payroll Pirate.
Detects the execution of 'consent.exe' from a user-writable temporary directory, specifically patterns associated with Bumblebee malware loading 'msimg32.dll' via DLL side-loading. This activity is often linked to trojanized installers like 'ManageEngine-OpManager.msi'.
Detects Akira ransomware deployment by monitoring the execution of suspected binary files (n.exe or locker.exe) from the C:\ProgramData directory, correlated with system recovery inhibition commands (e.g., vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit) executed on the same host within a 2-hour timeframe.
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