Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,051 copies47 likes38,376 views
11,679 detections
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using Event ID 4698 or command-line execution of schtasks.exe. The rule specifically looks for tasks created in suspicious paths such as AppData or ProgramData, or tasks configured to run with highest privileges and/or marked as hidden, which are common indicators of persistence mechanisms used by adversaries.
Detects a suspicious sequence of browser navigation/redirection events followed shortly by the manual execution of command-line utilities (PowerShell, CMD, or MSHTA) via explorer.exe, characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and executing commands from their clipboard.
Detects attempts to access or dump the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, a technique commonly used by adversaries to harvest domain credentials and clear-text passwords from memory.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior, including impossible travel (geo-velocity) and non-interactive authentication without MFA, specifically targeting patterns indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to open handles to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process with access rights consistent with credential dumping (e.g., PROCESS_VM_READ, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS). This rule also specifically flags the use of well-known tools and techniques such as Mimikatz, ProcDump, and the abuse of rundll32.exe with comsvcs.dll for memory extraction, which is indicative of OS Credential Dumping (T1003.001).
This rule detects persistence mechanisms by monitoring additions to Windows Registry Run keys or files created in the user's Startup directory. It specifically flags entries that target suspicious locations (e.g., Temp, AppData, Public) or attempt to execute encoded commands using PowerShell or CMD.
Detects known Cobalt Strike default named pipe naming conventions and cross-process reflective DLL injection activities into common Windows host processes such as rundll32.exe, svchost.exe, and others. This rule monitors for suspicious named pipe creation events and process memory manipulation patterns indicative of beacon behavior and post-exploitation injection.
Detects anomalous Kerberos TGS ticket requests (Event ID 4769) where a single user requests tickets for multiple distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs) using weak RC4 (0x17) encryption. This behavior is highly characteristic of Kerberoasting, a technique used by adversaries to harvest service account tickets for offline cracking.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activity by analyzing DNS query logs for high entropy in subdomains, elevated volumes of TXT/NULL record types, and frequent NXDOMAIN responses. This pattern is characteristic of command-and-control (C2) or data exfiltration techniques using tools like dnscat2 or iodine, which encode data into DNS query labels.
This rule detects potentially malicious inbox rule creation or modification in Office 365 Exchange. It flags rules that contain keywords associated with financial fraud (e.g., invoice, wire, payment) and include actions that hide evidence (e.g., moving messages to junk or deleting them). It further correlates these actions with suspicious user login activity, such as logging in from a new IP address or country within an hour of the rule change, which is a common indicator of a Business Email Compromise (BEC) account takeover.
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