Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects modifications to Windows Registry auto-start keys (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon, or Services) by suspicious processes (e.g., script interpreters, shell, or office applications) or processes running from temporary directories, where the registry value points to paths commonly used by adversaries (AppData, Temp, or ProgramData).
This rule detects cross-process operations where common user applications or scripting hosts initiate activity towards sensitive system processes (e.g., lsass.exe, services.exe). This pattern is a frequent indicator of process injection techniques used to achieve code execution in the context of high-privilege or critical system services, often for the purpose of credential theft or persistence.
Detects the execution of 'tscon.exe', a Windows utility used to control Remote Desktop sessions. The rule specifically alerts when 'tscon.exe' is executed with parameters indicative of session hijacking (such as '/dest:') or when it is invoked by suspicious processes or under SYSTEM privileges, which are characteristic of RDP session hijacking techniques used for privilege escalation and lateral movement.
Detects attempts to disable, stop, or reconfigure security software (Antivirus, EDR, Endpoint Protection) on Windows endpoints by abusing legitimate administrative utilities such as sc.exe, net.exe, taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell to tamper with service configurations or kill security-related processes.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying an abnormal volume of RC4-encrypted Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests (Event 4769) targeting service accounts, followed closely by a successful logon (Event 4624) from a previously dormant service account, suggesting the successful use of a cracked service ticket for unauthorized authentication.
Detects a ClickFix-style activity where an adversary uses nslookup.exe or certutil.exe to perform DNS TXT record queries for payload staging or C2 rendezvous. The rule identifies suspicious parent processes like explorer.exe or scripting hosts, correlates this with a subsequent outbound network connection from the same host, and is intended to capture DNS-based beaconing or data staging.
Detects lateral movement via SMB by identifying multiple connections to Windows admin shares (ADMIN$ or C$) followed within a 10-minute window by the creation of a remote service, often indicative of techniques like PsExec. This pattern detects suspicious fan-out behavior where a single source host interacts with multiple targets.
Detects a sequence of activity indicative of data exfiltration preparation. This rule identifies the creation of multiple large archive files (.zip, .rar, .7z) in temporary or staging directories on an endpoint, followed by a network connection transferring a significant volume of data to an external, non-private IP address within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of PsExec by identifying the creation of the PSEXESVC remote service or its associated named pipe. It also identifies renamed or masqueraded PsExec binaries by checking file metadata and provides a mechanism to flag unusual source-to-target host account pairings often associated with lateral movement via SMB/Admin Shares.
Detects automated API exploitation attempts, specifically Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) scanning. The rule triggers when a single source IP or API token exhibits high-frequency request patterns (5+ requests per second) against resource endpoints with sequentially incrementing IDs. It specifically correlates a spike in 401/403 authorization failures followed by a small count of 200 successes, indicating a potential successful bypass of authorization controls.
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