Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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This rule detects email-based phishing attempts that utilize a two-hop open-redirect mechanism by abusing legitimate SaaS platforms (holabrief.com and loopedin.io). It flags emails containing specific redirect links, often used to bypass traditional security filters by redirecting users through trusted domains before reaching a malicious destination.
This rule detects network connection events where the AutoGen Studio application (identified by its image filename) initiates connections to localhost (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on ports 8080 or 8081. This is typical behavior for the AutoGen Studio web interface or API server running locally.
Detects instances where SystemSettings.exe is spawned from non-standard directories often associated with the SharkLoader malware family, such as AppData roaming subdirectories or KasperskyLab program folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading and malicious staging.
Detects behavior patterns associated with the SharkLoader malware, specifically monitoring for anomalous thread creation, potential modification of primary tokens, and suspicious loading of SystemSettings.dll from non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, ProgramData). This rule aims to identify evasive techniques used to bypass Windows Loader Lock detection.
This rule monitors inbound emails that exhibit signs of phishing, specifically looking for failures in email authentication protocols (DKIM, DMARC), the use of specific invoice-themed subject lines, and the inclusion of redirection links pointing to known third-party collaboration platforms (HolaBrief, LoopedIn). It also identifies cases where the sender's envelope domain differs from the header's 'From' domain, which is a common indicator of email spoofing used in identity-based attacks.
Detects the deployment of SharkLoader components into suspicious directories (%APPDATA%\xwreg, %APPDATA%\xgdf, or %ProgramData%\KasperskyLab) followed by the execution of SystemSettings.exe from these locations. This rule also tracks the loading of encrypted DLL payloads like DscCoreR.mui or SyncRes.dat by these processes, which is indicative of a DLL sideloading execution chain.
This rule detects potential credential capture by monitoring for unauthorized usage of Windows API functions associated with keyboard hooking, such as SetWindowsHookEx and GetAsyncKeyState. It specifically flags suspicious process activity, such as the execution of the 'Pillager' tool or processes interacting with specific suspicious file paths, while excluding common legitimate processes that routinely perform keyboard hooking.
This rule detects common credential dumping techniques targeting the LSASS process memory (using comsvcs.dll, procdump, or procdump64) and extraction of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) using ntdsutil, vssadmin, diskshadow, or esentutl. These activities are indicative of credential theft and domain-wide reconnaissance.
Detects techniques used to perform credential dumping from the LSASS process memory, including the use of comsvcs.dll via rundll32, the procdump utility, and unauthorized process handle requests (OpenProcess) targeting lsass.exe.
Detects potential SharkLoader shellcode injection patterns, where a suspicious executable (e.g., sideloaded SystemSettings.exe) from specific non-standard directories initiates cross-process memory operations like VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread into critical system processes such as svchost.exe or explorer.exe.
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