Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting attempts by identifying an unusually high volume of Kerberos AS-REQ requests (Event ID 4768) where the preauthentication type is set to 0. These requests are grouped by source IP or client address, and alerts are triggered when the number of unique accounts targeted or the total request count exceeds defined thresholds. AS-REP Roasting is an attack technique that attempts to retrieve a TGT for user accounts that have Kerberos preauthentication disabled, making them susceptible to offline brute-force password cracking.
Detects persistence modification via Registry Run/RunOnce keys or the addition of suspicious files to the Windows Startup folder. The rule specifically monitors for registry values pointing to common volatile directories, script extensions, or suspicious command-line interpreters. It also flags new executables or scripts being written directly into startup directory paths. This rule covers both direct registry manipulation and startup folder placement, often associated with malware or adversary persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects potential process injection activity where a process is created in a suspended state and subsequently performs memory unmapping followed by a remote memory write operation. This behavior targets critical system processes such as svchost, explorer, lsass, services, and spoolsv, which is highly indicative of process hollowing or similar injection techniques used by malicious actors.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in-memory by monitoring command lines of common script-hosting processes (e.g., PowerShell, WScript, Rundll32) for strings indicative of AmsiScanBuffer patching, reflection, or manual configuration of AMSI initialization states.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activities often used for Command and Control (C2) communication. It monitors for high volumes of DNS requests involving records commonly abused for tunneling (TXT, NULL, CNAME) from a single host to a specific parent domain. It further identifies suspicious patterns characterized by long, high-entropy subdomain labels (>45 characters) and a high frequency of distinct labels, which are indicative of encoded C2 traffic.
This rule detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSUAPI) using Active Directory Event ID 4662. It specifically monitors for access requests to sensitive directory replication object GUIDs (Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All) where the requesting user account is not a domain controller computer account. This behavior is a common indicator of DCSync credential dumping attacks performed by tools like Mimikatz or Impacket.
Detects instances where PowerShell or pwsh processes are initiated directly by explorer.exe containing command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated or hidden execution, often used in ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where victims are coerced into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects OAuth2 authorization code flow attempts in Entra ID (Azure AD) sign-in logs where the redirect URI is external to the Microsoft ecosystem, followed by an immediate token issuance event to that same suspicious endpoint. This behavior is indicative of 'ClickFix' or 'ConsentFix' phishing attacks, where users are manipulated into copying an authorization code from a legitimate Microsoft sign-in prompt and pasting it into an attacker-controlled application.
Detects the abuse of Windows protocol handlers ('search-ms:') and WebDAV UNC paths ('@SSL\DavWWWRoot') launched from common web browsers or Windows shell processes. This technique, frequently observed in 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, enables attackers to stage remote payloads like LNK, HTA, or scripts by leveraging native Windows functionality to resolve remote content as if it were a local resource, bypassing typical file download security controls.
This rule detects persistence establishment via Scheduled Task creation shortly (within 15 minutes) after a suspicious PowerShell process execution. The PowerShell execution matches the 'ClickFix' pattern, characterized by hidden/bypass window styles and the invocation of remote download or execution cmdlets (e.g., IEX, IRM).
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