Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,051 copies47 likes38,382 views
11,679 detections
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Detects unusual internal SSH connections between private IP addresses that are not initiated by common, trusted administrative tools (like ssh.exe, putty.exe, etc.). The rule aggregates these connections by source and host to identify potential lateral movement.
This rule detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by monitoring for modifications to specific registry keys (ms-settings\Shell\Open\command) followed by the execution of known auto-elevating Windows binaries like 'fodhelper.exe' or 'computerdefaults.exe'. The rule correlates the registry modification with a subsequent process creation from an suspicious location, indicating a likely attempt to gain elevated privileges.
Detects anomalous activity associated with 'winupdate.exe', including suspicious registry run key persistence, execution from abnormal directories (e.g., AppData, .cache), and unauthorized outbound network connections to Pastebin. The rule triggers when multiple signals are observed from the same host and user, indicating potential malware behavior.
This rule detects the execution and creation of suspicious files named 'winupdate.exe' or 'SLaunch.exe' within the AppData cache directory, or processes involving 'YutaCore.dll' or a specific local host URL. It also checks for the execution of known malicious file hashes associated with this behavior.
This rule detects the use of standard Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin.exe, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe) to delete system backups, shadow copies, or disable recovery options. It specifically monitors for these commands when executed by suspicious parent processes or shells, which is a common tactic used by ransomware to prevent system restoration after encryption.
Detects the RoguePlanet quarantine artifact hijack technique, which involves two primary signals: the staging of 'wermgr.exe' within temporary 'RP_*' working directories and the unauthorized creation or modification of 'wermgr.exe' in 'C:\Windows\System32' by processes other than trusted Windows system components.
Detects anomalous activity involving the Windows Error Reporting service executable, wermgr.exe. This includes the suspicious creation of files within temporary directories that match known junction-based exploitation techniques, the creation of a 'wdtest_temp' subdirectory (often used as a working directory in exploit staging), and the execution of wermgr.exe from a path other than the expected Windows System32 directory.
Detects unauthorized access to wermgr.exe residing within Volume Shadow Copy paths or staged in specific temp directories. This behavior is associated with the RoguePlanet exploit, which uses this pattern to obtain SYSTEM-readable handles for subsequent oplock placement and TOCTOU (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use) race conditions to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects unauthorized attempts to place an exclusive byte-range lock on the wermgr.exe executable when accessed via Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) or temporary paths, which is characteristic of the RoguePlanet exploit. This technique is designed to stall Windows Defender's clean-up operations, creating a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race window for further exploitation.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll by potentially malicious Python-based processes (e.g., PyInstaller, scripts) or cross-process memory writes from such processes, which are indicative of in-memory patching of AMSI (AmsiOpenSession) or ETW (EtwEventWrite) to evade detection. The rule monitors for unsigned processes like 'python.exe' or 'winupdate.exe' performing these actions.
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