Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the creation or modification of files within the 'C:\ProgramData\Windows Multimedia' directory, a path associated with JFMBackdoor's screen capture output. The rule specifically monitors for this activity when initiated by 'fltMC.exe', which is known to be used by this malware for DLL side-loading.
Detects execution and staging activity associated with the NUKESPED (zlrenu8.exe) backdoor. The rule monitors for direct process execution from ProgramData, malicious DLL registration using rundll32, the creation of staged payload files in ProgramData, and suspicious memory operations (VirtualProtect) by the backdoor process, which are indicative of reflective loading or shellcode execution.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group's NUKESPED JSE loader, including the use of wscript/cscript to execute .jse files, drop encoded payloads via ADODB.Stream, and spawn hidden PowerShell processes for decoding stages (targeting .a9oc files in ProgramData). The rule also detects the creation and execution of the NUKESPED secondary payload zlrenu8.exe.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections to specific Fastly CDN IP addresses associated with the Kimsuky threat group's NUKESPED backdoor. The rule identifies processes attempting to communicate with these infrastructure IPs that are not part of a predefined list of trusted or common legitimate applications, indicating potential command and control (C2) activity.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED campaign, specifically the execution of .jse droppers from the Downloads directory using Windows Script Host (wscript.exe/cscript.exe), execution of known malicious files by SHA256 hash, and the presence or creation of the associated zlrenu8.exe payload.
Detects application consent by a user shortly after the same account clicked a code-of-conduct or compliance-themed message. This behavior can indicate a multi-stage phishing campaign where a user is lured into clicking a malicious link (e.g., a fake policy document) and subsequently grants OAuth permissions to a malicious application.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as common system utilities (e.g., sshd, cron, smbd) by executing from non-standard, often high-risk directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, /opt, or various home and dot-directories. This behavior is indicative of Velvet Ant's TTPs used to blend malicious binaries with standard system processes to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Detects the Amadey loader or StealC information stealer performing situational awareness by enumerating security software via WMI queries for 'AntiVirusProduct'. This behavior is typical of malware attempting to identify and evade defensive tools.
Detects read access to cryptocurrency wallet files and application directories (including Electrum, Exodus, Atomic, and generic wallet.dat files) by non-wallet associated processes. This behavior is consistent with credential harvesting activities by info-stealing malware such as StealC.
Detects a common self-deletion pattern used by the StealC infostealer. The malware attempts to clean up its own traces by launching cmd.exe with a command sequence involving a timeout delay, followed by the forced deletion of files within temporary or application data directories.
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