Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe with command-line arguments that contain suspicious file names, paths, or flags often associated with malicious behavior, such as persistence mechanisms or potential lateral movement tools.
Detects host reconnaissance activities performed by BeepRAT (Operation DragonClone) components such as HFY.exe, tcc.exe, or LuaJit.exe. The rule monitors for the spawning of system utilities like reg.exe to query specific registry keys (Windows NT version or Creeper persistence), systeminfo.exe for system enumeration, and wmic.exe for retrieving hardware and system information.
Detects the execution of HFY.exe, a known component of the BeepRAT malware family, along with the presence of its associated sideloaded or dependency DLL files (e.g., data.dll, SQLite.Interop.dll). The rule monitors both process creation events and file system artifacts indicative of the malware's deployment.
This rule detects activities associated with the BeepRAT malware, including the execution of LuaJit.exe with specific command-line arguments (config.ini, temp.bin), the creation of staging files in the TCC local AppData directory, and parent-child process relationships involving a known dropper (HFY.exe). It also utilizes specific SHA256 hashes to identify known malicious BeepRAT binaries.
Detects network and DNS indicators associated with BeepRAT, including connections to known C2 IP addresses on port 18848, resolution of known C2 domains, and suspicious DNS queries to 'doh.pub' from known loader processes (tcc.exe, HFY.exe).
This rule monitors for the presence of a specific malicious browser extension (by identifier) on the file system and simultaneously tracks outbound network connections to a known typosquatted domain ('perplexity-ai.online'). It alerts on the potential presence of an adversary-controlled browser plugin or user navigation to a malicious domain often used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects the use of the Tiny C Compiler (TCC) to compile or execute shellcode associated with BeepRAT malware. The rule monitors for characteristic TCC command line arguments ('-nostdlib', '-run') and specific file names ('temp.bin', 'config.ini.c') within the TCC deployment path that are indicative of staging and executing malicious code while attempting to bypass defensive mechanisms like AMSI, ETW, and WLDP.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' with command-line arguments containing specific patterns such as 'WindowsUpdateTempFileCleanUp', 'config.ini.c', 'SchTask_x86', or 'SchTask_x64'. These patterns are often associated with the deployment of malicious persistence mechanisms or software execution.
Detects the presence of a known malicious Chrome extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) or its associated files (e.g., rules.json, background.js) within browser extension storage directories on managed Windows endpoints. This rule monitors for file activity related to browser extensions that may have been deployed via malicious means to steal credentials or establish persistence.
Detects WMI activity used by the BeepRAT loader to query system information (Win32_OperatingSystem, CIM_Memory), which is characteristic of virtualization and sandbox evasion techniques. The rule correlates process creation and WMI event logs with known indicators associated with BeepRAT deployment.
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