
Tim Peck
@timpeckTrusted contributorCompletionist
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916 detections
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Detects the use of PowerShell to re-enable the deprecated and vulnerable SMB1 protocol. This protocol is often used by attackers for lateral movement to legacy systems, as highlighted by groups like The Gentlemen RaaS.
Detects file write, creation, or modification of C:\Windows\System32\TieringEngineService.exe
by any process other than legitimate Windows servicing components. The RedSun exploit
(CVE-2026-33825) overwrites this binary via a Defender cloud-file-rollback redirection
abuse, enabling SYSTEM-level code execution when the Tier Management Engine COM object
is subsequently invoked. Legitimate modification of this file is almost exclusively
performed by TrustedInstaller during Windows servicing operations.
by any process other than legitimate Windows servicing components. The RedSun exploit
(CVE-2026-33825) overwrites this binary via a Defender cloud-file-rollback redirection
abuse, enabling SYSTEM-level code execution when the Tier Management Engine COM object
is subsequently invoked. Legitimate modification of this file is almost exclusively
performed by TrustedInstaller during Windows servicing operations.
Detects curl commands using user-agent strings that Sapphire Sleet uses as campaign tracking identifiers in their macOS intrusion chain. Each stage of the cascading payload delivery uses a distinct UA (mac-cur1 through mac-cur5) to route requests to different server paths serving AppleScript payloads or ZIP archives containing malicious .app bundles.
Detects the classic Matt Graeber AMSI bypass technique using reflection to set amsiInitFailed to True. This one-liner disables AMSI scanning for the entire PowerShell session.
Detects successful sign-ins using the axios/1.7.9 user agent. Storm-2755 uses this to replay stolen session tokens and maintain persistence via automated sign-ins approximately every 30 minutes. The rule filters for successful authentications and requires at least two authentications from the same user, IP, and user agent within the time window to identify the repeated automated persistence loop.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules that move messages to rarely checked folders like Archive, RSS Subscriptions, Conversation History, Junk Email, or Deleted Items. This is a common post-exploitation technique used to hide fraudulent communications (BEC, payroll fraud) or suppress security alerts, MFA notifications, and password reset emails from the victim. Approximately 10% of compromised accounts have malicious mailbox rules created shortly after initial access.
Detects Adobe Reader initiating unexpected network connections, which may indicate an exploit fetching a secondary payload or communicating with a C2 server.
Detects DNS requests directed to the cloudapi[.]stream domain, which is associated with a widespread malicious Chrome extension campaign involving over 100 extensions. Monitoring for this specific domain allows defenders to identify compromised hosts regardless of the specific extension ID.
Detects HTTP requests containing the VS/PL/AN parameter combination used by JanelaRAT for C2 beaconing. The beacon reports malware version (VS), profile level (PL), and presence of banking security software (AN). JanelaRAT targets Latin American financial institutions (Brazil, Mexico). Note: C2 uses port 443 WITHOUT TLS encryption.
Detects non-Defender processes accessing or modifying the Defender signature definition file (mpasbase.vdm).
This behavior is indicative of the BlueHammer zero-day LPE, which leverages a batch oplock on this file to freeze Windows Defender mid-read, subsequently executing path confusion to force Defender to read the SAM hive as SYSTEM.
This behavior is indicative of the BlueHammer zero-day LPE, which leverages a batch oplock on this file to freeze Windows Defender mid-read, subsequently executing path confusion to force Defender to read the SAM hive as SYSTEM.
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