Tim Peck
@timpeckTrusted contributorCompletionist
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916 detections
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Detects the execution of a suspicious PowerShell dropper script, often initiated by a user clicking a malicious file (e.g., LNK). This pattern is common in phishing campaigns, including those by groups like Kimsuky. The detection looks for PowerShell commands that use common evasion techniques (like hidden windows or bypassing execution policies).
Detects the malicious telemetry.js file used in the s1ngularity supply chain attack. This script harvests sensitive developer assets and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories.
Detects the execution of LOLBins (msiexec.exe, mshta.exe) with command-line arguments to download or execute remote files, a technique used in the ShadowCaptcha campaign's initial access phase via fake CAPTCHA pages.
Detects outbound API calls to api.github.com for repository creation or file uploads matching patterns used in the s1ngularity supply chain attack.
Detects when a single Autonomous System Number (ASN) is associated with multiple organization names within a short time frame. This could indicate a rebranding or transfer of network blocks to evade sanctions or scrutiny, as seen with the Stark Industries threat activity enabler.
Detects PowerShell preparing to execute shellcode using the CallWindowProc API. This technique is used to bypass EDRs by executing code without creating a new thread, which is a commonly monitored API call.
Detects a Component Object Model (COM) TypeLib hijacking persistence technique. This rule identifies modifications to the registry for the 'Microsoft Web Browser' CLSID, where it is altered to point to a malicious scriptlet (.sct) file. This specific method was used by the MixShell malware in the ZipLine campaign to maintain access.
Detects the execution of a malicious Linux payload, possibly within a .desktop file, a technique used by APT36. The rule identifies a bash process executing an inline command that downloads and runs a payload, often using a combination of curl, xxd, base64, and eval.
Detects TOSHIS malware, a loader used in the TAOTH campaign to deploy Cobalt Strike or Merlin Agent. This rule identifies the malware based on unique strings found in the payload.
Detects potential DLL side-loading of the CANONSTAGER malware, which is used to deploy the SOGU.SEC backdoor. This rule identifies when the legitimate, signed Canon IJ Printer Assistant Tool (cnmpaui.exe) loads an unsigned DLL with a similar name (cnmpaui.dll) and subsequently reads a .dat file (cnmplog.dat), consistent with the TTPs of the PRC-nexus actor UNC6384.
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