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nomit vyas

@xoxo
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694 detections

Detects PowerShell execution with a command line indicative of a download cradle, initiated from the user's shell (explorer.exe). This behavior is characteristic of the "ClickFix" social engineering technique where a user is tricked into copying and running a malicious command from a webpage.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
This rule detects suspicious process command lines that indicate potential tunneling activity. It looks for commands containing 'tunnel', '--url', and '--logfile', while excluding legitimate 'cloudflared.exe' processes. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish covert communication channels or exfiltrate data.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
104
Detects a Python process spawning pip to install multiple libraries (requests, pycryptodome, psutil, pywin32) in a short time frame, a behavior associated with the Arkanix Stealer's Python loader.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
104
Detects the specific process chain: wscript.exe -> powershell.exe -> MSBuild.exe, which is characteristic of the SHADOW#REACTOR malware campaign. This chain indicates the use of scripting interpreters (Wscript and PowerShell) to launch MSBuild for malicious purposes, often involving in-memory execution or compilation of malicious code.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
104
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity involving 'cmd.exe' that echoes content into a batch file within the 'C:\Windows\TEMP\' directory and subsequently deletes it. This pattern can be indicative of malware staging or cleanup operations, often used to execute temporary scripts or hide traces of execution.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
102
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions within Microsoft Teams. This rule flags activities such as sideloaded app installations (which bypass Teams store vetting and can be used for persistence), custom app creation outside of typical development teams (potentially indicating C2 bots or data exfiltration apps), and the addition of bots, especially when combined with suspicious keywords in the app name. These actions can be indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or gaining unauthorized access and control within the Teams environment.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods with dangerous security settings that could lead to container escape or privilege escalation. This includes configurations such as hostNetwork enabled, allowPrivilegeEscalation set to true, or running as root (runAsUser = 0). The rule specifically monitors 'io.k8s.core.v1.pods.create' operations in cloud audit logs.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
102
Detects external users accessing internal Slack canvases and suspicious canvas deletion or access level changes. Canvases can contain sensitive runbooks, credentials, and organizational data, making these actions critical to monitor for potential data exfiltration or unauthorized access.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules designed to hide security and MFA notifications by deleting, marking as read, or moving them to hidden folders. This technique is commonly used post-compromise to suppress alerts about rogue device enrollment, sign-ins, or password changes, preventing the victim from discovering an account takeover. It is a frequent Business Email Compromise (BEC) and Account Takeover (ATO) persistence technique.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
202
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
202
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