Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,686 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,342
389
264
219
197
Contributors
620
506
358
209
102
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
2,686
Platforms
1,168
638
452
382
359
Products / Services
593
445
403
264
229
MITRE Techniques
1,884
787
525
521
510
CVEs
11
5
5
5
3
IDS Classtypes
189
133
34
10
7
IDS Protocols
243
58
33
22
12
This detection identifies repeated outbound email events where large files are sent multiple times within a specific time window. It helps uncover potential data exfiltration attempts or misuse of corporate email for transferring large files externally.
Thresholds for file size, frequency, and time window can be adjusted to fit organizational context.
Thresholds for file size, frequency, and time window can be adjusted to fit organizational context.
Detects possible Lumma infections based on non-browser network connections to TLDs or steamcommunity API as often seen in Lumma infections
Detects suspicious activities in Salesforce environments consistent with the TTPs of the ShinyHunters threat group (also tracked as UNC6040/UNC6240). The attack involves social engineering (vishing) to trick users into authorizing malicious OAuth applications that impersonate legitimate tools like 'Salesforce Data Loader'. This rule looks for key indicators such as the installation of unreviewed packages, creation of impersonating connected apps, elevation of permissions to 'full' API access, and large data exports.
Detects potential data exfiltration from cloud storage or SaaS platforms based on a large volume of data transferred or a high number of distinct files accessed by a single user or application within a one-hour window. This is a common TTP for threat actors like ShinyHunters who aim to steal large datasets.
Detects a single S3 object download event where the volume of data transferred exceeds a defined threshold. This can be an indicator of bulk data exfiltration. Attackers may download large archives or databases from compromised S3 buckets.
A new RoKRAT variant tied to APT37 delivers payloads via oversized LNK shortcuts, executing a two‑stage encrypted shellcode loader that uses steganography to conceal content. The malware achieves fileless execution by injecting into trusted processes (e.g., mspaint.exe, notepad.exe) and hides C2 activity within legitimate cloud storage services such as pCloud, Yandex Disk, and Dropbox, often leveraging hardcoded API tokens.
High‑level TTPs:
Initial Access: Malicious LNK files in compressed archives.
Execution & Persistence: PowerShell/BAT‑driven staged loaders with XOR decryption.
Defense Evasion: Process injection into signed Windows binaries; steganography for payload concealment.
Command & Control: Use of trusted cloud service APIs with embedded tokens to obfuscate malicious traffic.
High‑level TTPs:
Initial Access: Malicious LNK files in compressed archives.
Execution & Persistence: PowerShell/BAT‑driven staged loaders with XOR decryption.
Defense Evasion: Process injection into signed Windows binaries; steganography for payload concealment.
Command & Control: Use of trusted cloud service APIs with embedded tokens to obfuscate malicious traffic.
Detects network traffic to an ERMAC banking trojan exfiltration server by identifying a unique 'WWW-Authenticate' header in the HTTP response. This indicates a client device is communicating with a known ERMAC command and control server for data exfiltration.
Detects network connections to domains associated with BTunnels, a service that can be abused by attackers to establish reverse shells or persistence on a machine. The rule specifically looks for outbound connections where the destination hostname ends with '.btunnel.co.in'.
This rule detects the upload of files to cloud storage services that are known to be used for data exfiltration or are associated with suspicious tunneling activities. It leverages a list of suspicious domains (LOTTunnels) to identify potentially malicious file uploads.
This rule detects the creation of new Microsoft Power Automate flows that are configured to use connectors capable of exfiltrating data via email or collaboration platforms like Microsoft Teams. It specifically looks for flows created with connectors which could indicate an attempt to send sensitive information outside the organization.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts via email by monitoring internal users sending emails to external domains. It flags suspicious activity based on three criteria: a high volume of emails sent (over 100) combined with a large total data size (over 50 MB), a significant number of emails sent to personal domains (over 20), or a notable count of emails with sensitive subjects (over 5). The rule aggregates these metrics over a 1-day window for each user.
The analytic detects the execution of the 'gdrive' tool on a Linux host. This tool allows standard users to perform tasks associated with Google Drive via the command line, such as downloading, uploading, listing, updating, syncing, sharing, and managing accounts or files. Adversaries can use this tool to stage other tools or exfiltrate data. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system compromise or sensitive data theft.
This rule detects suspicious activity where scripting interpreters (node.exe, python.exe, pwsh.exe, powershell.exe) are observed accessing a large number of potentially sensitive files (e.g., .env, secret, wallet, keypair, credential, recovery files, or common document/data file types like .pdf, .docx, .csv, .json, .txt) and subsequently exfiltrating a significant amount of data over the network. It correlates file access events with network outbound traffic from the same process within a 10-minute window, flagging instances where more than 20 distinct sensitive files are accessed and over 500KB of data is sent out.
The analytic detects the execution of the 'gdrive' tool on a Windows host. This tool allows standard users to perform tasks associated with Google Drive via the command line, such as downloading, uploading, listing, updating, syncing, sharing, and managing accounts or files. Adversaries commonly use this tool to stage other tools or exfiltrate data. Detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system compromise or sensitive data theft.
Detects the use of the 'mdimport' command to index sensitive user directories. This is a key step in the Sploitlight TCC bypass technique (CVE-2025-31199), where a malicious Spotlight importer is triggered to run within the 'mdworker' process and exfiltrate data from TCC-protected locations by writing it to the system log.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts using the built-in Windows `ping.exe` utility. Specifically, it looks for `ping.exe` executions where a large payload size (greater than 1024 bytes) is specified using the -L command-line argument. This technique can be used to tunnel data over ICMP, which might bypass some network defenses.
Detects the use of GoodSync command-line tools for data exfiltration, a TTP associated with the Chaos ransomware group. The rule looks for suspicious command-line patterns, including masquerading as wininit.exe.
The following analytic detects the usage of specific Exchange PowerShell modules, such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ManagementRoleAssignment, New-MailboxSearch, and Get-Recipient. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify these commands. This activity is significant because these modules can be exploited by adversaries who have gained access via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox contents, assign management roles, conduct mailbox searches, or view recipient objects, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The following analytic identifies suspicious Cmdlet usage in Exchange Management logs, focusing on commands like New-MailboxExportRequest and New-ManagementRoleAssignment. It leverages EventCode 1 and specific Message patterns to detect potential ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell abuse. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or manipulation of mailboxes and roles, which are critical for maintaining email security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox data, assign new roles, or search mailboxes, leading to data breaches and privilege escalation.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to Dropbox API endpoints (api.dropboxapi.com or content.dropboxapi.com) originating from any executable that is not the legitimate Dropbox application. This behavior can indicate an adversary using a non-standard or malicious process to exfiltrate data or establish command and control via Dropbox.
Detects large data transfers over SSH/SCP (port 22) to or from an ESXi host. This activity is highly suspicious and could indicate an attacker delivering a ransomware payload to the hypervisor or exfiltrating sensitive data (like VMDK files).
Page 112 of 128