Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects incoming emails that contain suspicious attachment types (e.g., RAR, ZIP) or links to file-sharing services, combined with subject lines commonly used in phishing campaigns. This pattern is indicative of initial access attempts via spear-phishing.
This detection looks for emails which include URLs with ‘amp/s’. This is an indicator of Google AMP Phishing which uses legitimate Google domains to redirect to the malicious URLs. When detected this is a high confident sign of phishing.
In May 2025, a campaign started using the Microsoft Exchange Direct Send feature to send phishing mails to organizations. This feature is designed for use by printers, scanners, cloud services and other devices that need to send messages on behalf of the company. This detection rule tries to detect the malicious mails being send via Direct Send using a couple of indicators:
- Sender email is the same as Recipient email
- SPF and DMARC both failed
- Mail is not comming in via an Exchange connector
- The sender IP address country is not a country that the user is known to login from
FYI, if you remove the country check (last line of the query), you can use the query to identify if there are legitimate mails as well. If not, you can disable the Direct Send feature in Exchange Online.
- Sender email is the same as Recipient email
- SPF and DMARC both failed
- Mail is not comming in via an Exchange connector
- The sender IP address country is not a country that the user is known to login from
FYI, if you remove the country check (last line of the query), you can use the query to identify if there are legitimate mails as well. If not, you can disable the Direct Send feature in Exchange Online.
This rule identifies users who have clicked on specific URLs that are known to be associated with phishing attempts. It correlates email URL information with URL click events to pinpoint users who interacted with malicious links shared via email. This is particularly useful for identifying victims of targeted phishing campaigns.
This rule identifies users who clicked on URLs within emails from a specific sender. It correlates email events, URL information, and URL click events to pinpoint which users interacted with links in emails, particularly useful for tracking responses to potential phishing attempts from a compromised account.
This rule identifies inbound emails that have been delivered to the organization's email domain and are categorized as 'Phishing' by the email security system. It specifically looks for phishing indicators within the email's attachment or body. The query then summarizes the count of such emails by their URL domain, sorting them to highlight the most frequent phishing domains. The accompanying Python script demonstrates how to cross-reference these identified URL domains with VirusTotal for further analysis.
This rule detects inbound emails where the sender's domain contains "microsoft" but does not end with "microsoft.com". This is a common tactic used in phishing attacks to spoof legitimate Microsoft domains, tricking recipients into believing the email is from a trusted source.
This rule detects Tycoon and ODx AiTM phishing activity that bypasses MFA. It matches:
🔹 Network connections to known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URLs.
🔹 Email-URL clicks and Azure AD sign-in events involving those domains or specific malicious application IDs.
🔹 Sign-ins originating from suspect IP addresses or user-agent strings.
🔹 Network connections to known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URLs.
🔹 Email-URL clicks and Azure AD sign-in events involving those domains or specific malicious application IDs.
🔹 Sign-ins originating from suspect IP addresses or user-agent strings.
Detects indicators of compromise (IOCs) and suspicious OAuth consent activity
linked to the Tycoon/ODx phishing kits. These campaigns impersonate Microsoft
OAuth apps to bypass MFA and harvest Microsoft 365 credentials.
linked to the Tycoon/ODx phishing kits. These campaigns impersonate Microsoft
OAuth apps to bypass MFA and harvest Microsoft 365 credentials.
Hunts for Office 365 emails that contain URLs of popular Monero exchanges or keywords related to Monero wallet addresses. This could indicate phishing attempts, scams, or other illicit activities.
Detects network traffic associated with the Tycoon and ODx phishing kits, which are used in Attacker-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns to bypass MFA. The rule identifies connections to known malicious domains, IP addresses, and specific URLs used by these kits.
Suspicious Email Impersonating DocuSign Service Sent to {{RecipientEmailAddress}}
Flags an inbound phishing email impersonating the DocuSign service using lookalike domains, URLs, or attachments.
Flags an inbound phishing email impersonating the DocuSign service using lookalike domains, URLs, or attachments.
Purpose: Hunts for risky OAuth applications in Microsoft 365 with overly permissive Microsoft Graph permissions.
Key Actions:
Finds enabled OAuth apps and retrieves their latest state (arg_max).
Expands permissions and flags sensitive ones (e.g., Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, User.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All).
Notes publisher verification, origin, and last modification date.
Marks risky apps via HasRiskyPermissions flag.
Use Cases: Detects malicious consent grant phishing, overprivileged third-party apps, and integrations that could enable data theft or long-term access.
Key Actions:
Finds enabled OAuth apps and retrieves their latest state (arg_max).
Expands permissions and flags sensitive ones (e.g., Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, User.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All).
Notes publisher verification, origin, and last modification date.
Marks risky apps via HasRiskyPermissions flag.
Use Cases: Detects malicious consent grant phishing, overprivileged third-party apps, and integrations that could enable data theft or long-term access.
This rule detects successful device registrations to the 'Device Registration Service' in Azure Entra. It specifically looks for sign-in events where the ResourceDisplayName is 'Device Registration Service', the ErrorCode is '0' (indicating success), and the ConditionalAccessStatus is not '1' (which typically means that conditional access did not block the authentication flow for device registration).
The rule is pivotal for hunting devices registered for persistence, post-successful phishing campaign execution, where >= 1 accounts were compromised.
The rule is pivotal for hunting devices registered for persistence, post-successful phishing campaign execution, where >= 1 accounts were compromised.
Detects .lnk (shortcut) files launched by scripting engines (e.g., PowerShell, CMD, WScript) exhibiting suspicious traits like hidden execution, embedded commands, or admin privilege requests. Common in phishing, LOLBin abuse, and initial access.
This rule detects instances where an email with identified threats (e.g., malware, phishing) is received and a URL within that email is subsequently clicked by a user. It correlates email threat information with URL click events to identify successful user interaction with malicious links.
This rule detects instances where a user clicks on a URL within an email, and subsequently, the email is moved to quarantine. This sequence of events suggests that the email was initially delivered, a user interacted with a potentially malicious link, and then a post-delivery security action (quarantine) was taken, indicating a delayed detection of a threat, likely phishing or malware.
This rule detects email events that have an identified threat name and are associated with a URL click event. This combination suggests a user has clicked on a malicious link delivered via email.
This rule detects network connections, email activity, URL clicks, and Teams messages that involve domains commonly used by threat actor group Scattered Spider. It specifically looks for domains containing '-servicedesk.', '-okta.', '-sso.', '-cms.', '-helpdesk.', or 'oktalogin-'. The rule aims to identify potential phishing attempts or suspicious activity targeting SSO/helpdesk credentials by monitoring interactions with these specific domain patterns across multiple data sources.
This detection identifies emails containing links that use well-known URL shortening services (e.g., bit.ly, t.co, tinyurl.com). While these services are commonly used for legitimate purposes, they are frequently abused by threat actors to obfuscate malicious destinations. This detection joins EmailUrlInfo with EmailEvents to include sender metadata and filters out trusted senders based on a configurable watchlist (ShortenerSafeSenders).
The following analytic detects the creation of registry artifacts when an ISO container is opened, clicked, or mounted on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring registry keys related to recent ISO or IMG file executions. This activity is significant as adversaries increasingly use container-based phishing campaigns to bypass macro-based document execution controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an initial access attempt, potentially leading to further exploitation, persistence, or data exfiltration within the environment.
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